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Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within
Concluding Chapter in Kalyani Robins, ed.,
THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(Edward Elgar, 2015)
--Erin Ryan±
The intensity of federalism disputes reflects inexorable pressure on all levels of government to
meet the increasingly complicated challenges of governance in an ever more interconnected world.
Yet even as federalism dilemmas continue to erupt all from all corners, environmental law remains at
the forefront of controversy. This chapter argues that environmental law is uniquely prone to
federalism discord because it inevitably confronts the core question with which federalism grapples—
who gets to decide?—in contexts where state and federal claims to power are simultaneously at their
strongest. Environmental problems tend to match the need to regulate the harmful use of specific
lands (among the most sacred of local prerogatives) with the need to regulate border-crossing harms
caused by these uses (among the strongest of national prerogatives). As a result, it is often impossible
to solve the problem without engaging authority on both ends of the spectrum—and disputes erupt
when local and national ideas on how best to proceed diverge. Ongoing jurisdictional controversies in
energy policy, pollution law, and natural resource management reveal environmental law as the
canary in federalism’s coal mine, showcasing the underlying reasons for jurisdictional conflict in all
areas of law.
Concluding the book, this chapter explores why environmental law regularly raises such
thorny questions of federalism, and how environmental law has adapted at the structural level to
manage federalism conflicts. Drawing from the theoretical framework that I introduced in
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (OXFORD, 2012), Part II reviews the central objectives of
federalism, examining the conflicting values they imply and the resulting tension that suffuses all
federalism-sensitive governance. Part III evaluates why federalism conflicts are heightened in the
context of environmental law. Divisiveness not only reflects the intense competition among federalism
values in environmental governance, it also provides key insights into the core theoretical dilemmas of
jurisdictional overlap more generally. Part IV probes how environmental law has adapted to manage
the challenges of overlap by asymmetrically allocating local, state, and federal authority within
various models of collaborative or coordinated governance. Part V concludes with consideration of
what the larger discourse can learn from the dynamic federalism and multiscalar governance
innovations emerging from within environmental governance. Through processes that engage
stakeholders at all levels of jurisdictional scale, environmental federalism is lighting a path away from
the old presumptions of “zero-sum” federalism and toward a model of negotiated multiscalar
governance emphasizing consultation, compromise, and coordination.
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I.

Introduction

Anyone paying attention will have noticed that, of late, many of the most controversial issues in
American governance involve questions of federalism. Lawmakers, judges, pundits, and average citizens
are regularly embroiled in arguments over the federalism implications of pollution law,1 health care
reform,2 energy policy,3 marriage rights,4 farm and forest regulation,5 immigration,6 species protection,7
1

E.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (upholding EPA’s Clean Air Act
interstate pollution regulations); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (limiting federal authority to regulate
certain wetlands under the Clean Water Act); CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (holding that the
federal Superfund statute does not preempt state statutes of repose).
2
E.g., National Federation of Independent Businesses vs. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding certain
mandates of the Affordable Care Act under the federal taxing power but invalidating other mandates relating to the
state-federal Medicaid partnership for exceeding the spending power).
3
E.g., Adam Vann, et al., Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues, U.S. Congressional Research Service
(R42124, January 20, 2012) (discussing state-federal conflicts over the proposed pipeline, including siting issues
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national security,8 climate change,9 and other hot-button political controversies.10 Each one elicits
diverging views about the appropriate policy content of the regulatory response, and federalism is
sometimes invoked for purposes that are more strategic than principled.11 Nevertheless, each one also
forces us to confront the ultimate federalism dilemma of who, exactly, should have the final say over
policy content.12 Should ultimate control rest with the local community? The state? The national
government? Some collaborative alliance among them? The dilemma is heightened in contexts of
jurisdictional overlap, where different local, state, and national regulatory interests or obligations are
simultaneously implicated.13 The intensity of federalism disputes reflects the inexorable pressure on all
levels of government to meet the increasingly complicated challenges of governance in an ever more
interconnected world, where the answers to jurisdictional questions are less and less obvious.14
Yet even as federalism dilemmas continue to erupt all from all corners of the regulatory map, the
forgoing chapters show that environmental law remains at the forefront of federalism controversy, and

pitting state land use law against federal authority under the Commerce Clause and dormant Commerce Clause);
Hari M. Osofsky and Hannah Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md. L. Rev. 773 (2013) (discussing
federalism issues in energy policy); Jeremiah I. Williamson and Matthias L. Sayer, Federalism in Renewable Energy
Policy, 27 NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVIRON. 1 (2012) (listing different state programs).
4
E.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (enforcing the District Court’s ruling that California’s gay
marriage ban was unconstitutional after concluding that the initiative sponsors lacked standing to appeal), U.S. v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating important parts of the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
5
E.g., Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Coalition, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (examining the Clean
Water Act Silviculture Rule and holding that certain discharges from logging roads are exempt from Clean Water
Act permitting requirements); Alt v. EPA, No. 2:12-CV-42, at 17–18 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 23, 2013) (holding a
concentrated animal feeding operation exempted from Clean Water Act permitting requirements as agricultural
exemption).
6
E.g., Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (affirming broad federal authority over immigration and
naturalization while allowing some state regulation relating to immigration).
7
E.g., In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 709 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (upholding federal action listing the polar bear under the Endangered Species Act and rejecting, inter alia,
Alaska’s claim that the agency failed to properly account for state management recommendations).
8
E.g., Christopher Dickey, The Spymaster of New York, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2009, at 40-41,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/01/30/the-spymaster-of-new-york.html (reporting on overlapping counterterrorism intelligence gathering by the CIA and NYPD).
9
E.g., Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding a state’s challenge to the federal agency’s
decision not to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act). Several states have also initiated cap-and-trade
programs in the absence of comprehensive federal climate regulation. See Western Climate Initiative,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/milestones (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (detailing California’s program);
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climateinitiatives/mggra (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (reporting on the Midwestern states’ program and noting that although
it has not been suspended, participating states have ceased moving forward with it).
10
See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN xviii-xx (Oxford, 2012) (cataloging high-profile
federalism controversies in all fields of law, including gun control, violence against women, minimum wage
requirements, marijuana policy, radioactive waste disposal, and others) (hereinafter, “TUG OF WAR”).
11
Id. at 35-37 (discussing the strategic use of federalism rhetoric).
12
Id. at xii-xvii.
13
Id. at 146-50.
14
Erin Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, in Alberto López Basaguren and Leire
Escajedo San-Epifanio, eds., THE WAYS OF FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF
TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN, VOL. 1 (Springer, 2013).
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that it is likely to do so for some time. From mining15 to nuclear waste16 to water pollution17 to climate
change,18 the Supreme Court’s environmental federalism cases have always been among the most
contentious of its jurisprudence,19 a phenomenon matched in the lower courts.20 Environmental cases
have also produced some of the most fractured judicial opinions on record (including some that have
produced famously unworkable precedent going forward).21 Federalism dilemmas are usually hard, and
often divisive. But why is this so accentuated when the subject at hand is the environment?
In fact, environmental law is uniquely prone to federalism discord because it inevitably confronts
the core question with which federalism grapples—who gets to decide?22—in contexts where state and
federal claims to power are simultaneously at their strongest. Environmental problems tend to match the
need to regulate the harmful use of specific lands (among the most sacred of local prerogatives) with the
need to regulate border-crossing harms caused by these uses (among the strongest of national
prerogatives). As a result, it is often impossible to solve the problem without engaging authority on both
ends of the spectrum—and disputes erupt when local and national ideas on how best to proceed diverge.23
Famous environmental decisions like New York v. United States (invalidating parts of a statefederal plan to manage radioactive waste),24 Rapanos v. United States (limiting federal authority over
intrastate wetlands under the Clean Water Act),25 and even Massachussets v. EPA (allowing a state to sue
the federal government for failing to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act)26 all feature
variations on the theme of jurisdictional conflict over competing regulatory concerns. Together with
ongoing jurisdictional controversies in energy policy, pollution law, and natural resource management,
they reveal environmental law as the canary in federalism’s coal mine, showcasing the underlying reasons

15

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
17
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531
U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006).
18
Cf. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). As discussed further, infra,
while this case is not usually viewed as a federalism decision, it raises the core environmental federalism problem of
which aspects of environmental regulation are the primary prerogative of the federal and state governments.
19
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-46, 147-80 (discussing the intensity of environmental
federalism disputes).
20
E.g., Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding under the Commerce Clause the Endangered
Species Act’s regulation of the hunting of endangered red wolves); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582
F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009) rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 180 L. Ed. 2d 435 (U.S. 2011) (allowing municipal plaintiffs to
bring a public nuisance suit against defendant power plants over alleged harms from greenhouse gas emissions).
21
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (limiting federal authority over certain wetlands
but failing to set forth an articulable principle for state or federal agency interpretation going forward). Rapanos is
discussed further infra in Part III.
22
RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at xii-xvii (defining federalism as the constitutional means for allocating
decision-making authority among the federal and state governments).
23
See id. at 105-180 (discussing the challenges of jurisdictional overlap for the traditional “dual federalism”
model of state-federal relations).
24
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
25
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006).
26
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007). All three cases are discussed further infra at Part IV.
16
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for jurisdictional conflict in all areas of law. And they indicate the critical need to better cope with the
problems of jurisdictional overlap at the level of federalism theory.27
Concluding the book, this chapter explores why environmental law regularly raises such thorny
questions of federalism, and how environmental law has specifically adapted to manage federalism
conflicts. Drawing from the theoretical framework I introduced in FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR
WITHIN,28 Part II reviews the central objectives of federalism, examining the conflicting values they
imply and the resulting tension that suffuses all federalism-sensitive governance. Against this theoretical
backdrop, Part III evaluates why federalism conflicts are especially heightened in the context of
environmental law. The characteristic divisiveness of environmental federalism reflects the intense
competition among federalism values in environmental governance, while also providing key insights into
the core theoretical dilemmas of jurisdictional overlap more generally.
After analyzing why environmental federalism is so fraught, the second half of the chapter
assesses how environmental law has responded to the challenges of jurisdictional overlap at the structural
level. Part IV probes how different environmental statutes asymmetrically allocate local, state, and
federal authority within various models of collaborative governance or cooperative federalism, including
programs of coordinated capacity, federally supported state implementation, conditional preemption, and
shared and general permitting programs. Part V concludes with consideration of what the larger discourse
can learn from the dynamic federalism innovations emerging from the study and practice of multiscalar
environmental governance.
This analysis, supported by others in the book, reveals that the most successful environmental
governance is conducted through processes of consultation, compromise, and coordination that engage
stakeholders at all levels of jurisdictional scale. Indeed, the broader federalism discourse is increasingly
recognizing environmental federalism29 for lighting a path away from the entrenched “zero-sum” model,
which treats every assertion of authority at one jurisdictional level as a loss of authority for the others.30
Many areas of environmental law doubtlessly remain imperfect in their implementation of these ideals,
and emergency circumstances will occasionally require less deliberative government action. Still, the
most successful examples of environmental governance suggest that, at the end of the day, good
multiscalar governance is essentially a project of negotiation.
II. Federalism as a Tool of Good Governance
To understand why environmental federalism is especially fraught, we must first understand why
federalism itself is so fraught. This Part prepares the analysis of environmental federalism specifically by
exploring the purposes and challenges of federalism more generally, beginning with the principles of
good governance that federalism and other multiscalar forms of government are designed to promote. It
27

RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 7-17, 30-33.
Id.
29
See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1902, 1909
(2014) (noting that environmental federalism has been “ground zero for much of the new thinking on federalism”).
30
Id. at 267-68; see also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2011).
28

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532687

Erin Ryan

Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within

8/20/2014

then examines the governance challenges that arise when federalism interpreters are forced to grapple
with the inevitable tension among these principles, at the level of both theory and practice.31
A. The Objectives of Federalism. Federalism is a system of government that divides sovereign
power between a central authority and regional political subunits—American states, Canadian provinces,
German Länder, the nation states of the European Union, etc.—each with the authority to directly regulate
citizens within its own jurisdiction.32 The American system of “dual sovereignty” recognizes separate
sources of sovereign authority in the federal and state governments, but as demonstrated by the chapters
in Part V of this book,33 the range of federal systems worldwide demonstrates many different ways of
allocating regulatory authority within the overall model.34 Federalism issues usually present as questions
about which level of government is entitled to decide the unfolding course of a given regulatory policy.35
Each demands that we resolve whether the given regulatory matter is within the jurisdiction of local, state,
regional, national, or international authorities—or some combination thereof.
In the United States and other formal federal systems, federalism questions are embedded within
larger issues of constitutional structure, implicating additional questions about the separation of powers
between state and federal sovereigns and interpretive authority among the three branches of
government.36 But even in non-federal national and international contexts, similar issues arise concerning
regulatory scale, competition, and collaboration. And even within the American system, issues of
regulatory scale and dynamic interaction extend beyond constitutionally cognizable state-federal relations
to the various ways that towns, cities, counties, metropolitan partnerships, and regional associations
manage interjurisdictional governance (not to mention the growing phenomenon of international
partnerships between subnational actors).37

31

Some of this analysis draws on previous scholarship. To avoid unduly reiterating that work, it provides
supporting citations to the deeper analysis in earlier publications, usually without further reference in the main text.
32
RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 7-8.
33
See Robert Fowler, The Australian Experience with Environmental Federalism, supra, Chapter 12; Nathalie
Behnke & Annegret Eppler, German Environmental Federalism in the Multi-level System of the European Union,
supra, Chapter 13; Sairam Bhat, The Paradoc of Environmental Federalism in India, supra, Chapter 14.
34
Id. The Forum on Federations, which researches federalism and devolved governance, reports that the
countries of the world include 25 federal systems at present, governing 40% of the world’s population, with an
additional two countries in transition to federalism. See “Federalism by Country,” The Forum on Federations,,
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/federalismbycountry (last visited August 12, 2014).
35
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at xii-xvii (defining federalism as the constitutional means for
allocating decision-making authority among the federal and state governments).
36
See id. (addressing constitutional interpretive questions associated with American federalism in detail).
37
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Hari M. Osofsky,
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237 (2011)
(discussing the significance of government levels beyond the state-federal dichotomy); Judith Resnik, Lessons in
Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards”
of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1929 (2008) (discussing the role of local actors in federalism
dilemmas); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007) (discussing how local and federal actors can align against state actors);
David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 378-79 (2001) (discussing the
distinct spheres of local, state, and national power).
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Nevertheless, for every system of multiscalar governance, the fundamental issue is the same: how
to manage regulatory challenges in a way that best balances the good governance ideals that its framers
seek to accomplish. In opening FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, I argue that “federalism is
best understood not just in terms of the conflict between states’ rights and federal power, or the debate
over judicial constraints and political process, or even the dueling claims over original intent—but instead
through the inevitable conflicts that play out among federalism’s core principles.”38 This chapter’s
exploration of that conflict is based on the American model, because it was within the American
constitutional experiment that the innovation of federalism was first born.39 However, the principles of
good multiscalar governance that undergird the American federal system have taken root within
international norms, influencing governance in many other parts of the world as well.
B. Federalism Values and the Tug of War Within.40 Analysis of the legislative history of the
American Constitutional Convention, later Supreme Court interpretations, congressional and executive
pronouncements, and the academic literature yields five foundational good governance values that
American federalism is designed to advance.41 These emphasize the maintenance of (1) checks and
balances between opposing centers of power that protect individuals; (2) governmental accountability and
transparency that enhance democratic participation; (3) local autonomy that enables interjurisdictional
innovation and competition; (4) centralized authority to manage collective action problems and vindicate
core constitutional promises; and finally (5) the regulatory problem-solving synergy that federalism
enables between the unique governance capacities of local and national actors for coping with problems
that neither can resolve alone.42
Governance in pursuit of these values advances individual dignity within healthy communities. It
enhances democratic governance principles of self-determination while recognizing the responsibilities
that group members hold toward one another. It creates a laboratory for innovations in governance from
multiple possible sources43 and facilitates multiple planes of negotiation among competing interests and

38

See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at xi.
See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010); EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL
INQUIRY (2007).
40
This section summarizes key insights from my book by the related title, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR
WITHIN, RYAN, supra note 10.
41
Id. at 34-67. In the book, I discuss the four federalism values most directly voiced in American federalism
jurisprudence: checks and balances, transparency and accountability, localism values, and the problem-solving value
implied by subsidiarity. Here, I add overt discussion of the values of centralized power that counterbalance the
localism values within federalism. Because they are implicit in the creation of an overall nation-state, these values
are debated less directly in the many cases that presume the value of centralized national authority but debate its
appropriate relationship with subnational authority. These values are also implied by the value of intergovernmental
problem-solving synergy. That said, so many environmental laws especially tap these values of central authority
that I believe it is worth explicitly highlighting here as the fifth in the series.
42
See id. at xiv, 34-67 (specifically detailing the values of checks, transparency, localism, and synergy and
dealing more holistically with the nationalism values necessarily implied by a federal system).
43
For the most famous statement of this principle, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (comparing the states to laboratories in which to “try novel social and economic
experiments”).
39
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interest groups.44 It appropriately honors both sides of the subsidiarity principle—the directive to solve
problems at the most local level possible45—which notably couples its preference for local autonomy in
governance with the expectation of effective regulatory problem-solving (and by implication, at whatever
level will achieve it).46
However, identifying what federalism is designed to accomplish is only the first part of the
puzzle. The harder task is figuring out how these goals fit together. The core federalism values are
doubtlessly all good things in and of themselves, and American governance has long aspired to realize
each of them independently. Yet our success has been complicated by the fact that each individual good
governance value is suspended in a web of tensions with the others. No matter how we may try, the hard
truth is that they all cannot always be satisfied simultaneously in any given context. The regulatory
choices we make inevitably involve tradeoffs, in which one value may partially eclipse another.47
Conflicts between localism and nationalism are obvious, but the network of tension runs much deeper and
among all the various values.
To take another example, consider the tension between the values of (1) checks on sovereign
authority and (2) transparent and accountable government. Federalism promotes a balanced system of
checks on sovereign authority at both the state and federal level, enabling the useful tool of governance
that I have previously called “regulatory backstop,” which protects individuals against government excess
or abdication by either side.48 When sovereign authority at one level fails to protect the vulnerable,
regulatory backstop ensures that it remains available to do so at a different level. The history of civil
rights law reveals especially famous examples, matching periods in which the federal government
protected the rights of African-Americans forsaken by state law49 with more modern examples in which
states have acted to protect rights unrecognized by federal law, including those of LGBT citizens50 and

44

See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 265-367 (discussing negotiated federalism among the various levels
and branches of government). See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30 (introducing the analysis that
evolved into this final part of the book).
45
See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV.
103, 103 (2001). For various accounts of the subsidiary principle, see David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG
2D 359 (1998); James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization:
The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004); John F. Stinneford, Subsidiarity, Federalism, and
Federal Prosecution of Street Crime, 2 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 495 (2005); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity
Principle in European Union Law—American Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 61 (1995); Jared
Bayer, Comment, Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity in the United
States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1421 (2004).
46
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 59-66.
47
Id. at 38-39 (and more generally at 34-67).
48
Id. at 39-44 (discussing checks and balances); 42-43 (discussing regulatory backstop).
49
E.g., Marilyn K. Howard, Discrimination, in 1 THE JIM CROW ENCYCLOPEDIA 222, 226-27 (Nikki L.M.
Brown & Barry M. Stentiford eds., 2008).
50
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (amending marriage definition from union between a man and
woman to a union between two people); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 and 24-34-402 (2007) (barring
discrimination in hiring based on sexual orientation); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003) (asserting that the Massachusetts constitution is more protective of civil rights than the federal Constitution in
invalidating a state statutory ban on same-sex marriages). Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1745 (2005) (discussing San Francisco’s decision to issue gay marriage licenses despite contrary state law).
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the owners of property subject to eminent domain.51 Environmental law showcases equally compelling
examples of dual sovereignty at its best,52 including the 1970s era in which the federal government acted
to prevent excessive air and water pollution when most states had failed to do so,53 and the current era in
which many states are moving to address the causes and effects of climate change at a time when the
national government has not succeeded.54
Yet the availability of regulatory backstop exacts a price. The very maintenance of checks and
balances between state and national actors itself frustrates the independent value of transparency, making
it harder for the average citizen to navigate the lines of governmental accountability (and know whom to
blame for bad policy choices).55 This is especially problematic in realms of extreme jurisdictional
overlap, such as environmental or criminal law, where legitimate state and federal governance takes place
simultaneously.56 As I describe in FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, if all we cared about
were the good governance values of transparency and accountability, the best alternative would be a
unitary system of government, such as that in use by France or China.57 Alternatively, if checks and
balances were the primary governance ideal, then we should do away with the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause,58 which gives the national government a powerful edge in many state-federal conflicts.59 If
localism values were primary, then our best course of action would be a confederal system among
powerful states and a weak center, lacking federal constitutional supremacy (not unlike the nation’s first
experiment with the Articles of Confederation).60
Instead, we tolerate the open tension between checks and transparency, and the obvious conflicts
between localism values and strong national power, and all the other tradeoffs that palpably manifest
among the five—precisely to reap the federalism-facilitated benefits of local autonomy when desirable,
national uniformity when preferable, regulatory backstop when necessary, and interjurisdictional
problem-solving when inevitable.61 Strong local authority expands opportunities for democratic
participation, encourages well-tailored governance, facilitates diversity, inspires innovation, and
encourages interjurisdictional competition.62 Strong national power resolves collective action problems,

More recently, the Supreme Court removed an important federal obstacle to state efforts to legalize gay marriage.
U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating parts of the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
51
See, e.g., Tim Hoover, Eminent Domain Reform Signed, KAN. CITY STAR, July 14, 2006, at B2 (reporting on
new state law property rights).
52
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at xxvii-xxix.
53
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2006).
54
See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives in the Wake of Federal Climate
Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS 432 (2009); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is
Motivating State and Local Governments To Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism
and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006). See also Engel, Chapter X; Buzbee, Chapter Y; Kaswan,
Chapter Z.
55
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 43-50.
56
Id. at 145-80.
57
Id. at 48.
58
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
59
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 43-44.
60
Notably, this unsuccessful experiment was rejected in favor of true federalism. Id.
61
Id. at 34-67.
62
Id. at 50-59.
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facilitates markets, manages border-crossing harms and large-scale public commons, speaks to the world
with a unitary voice, and vindicates non-negotiable constitutional promises.63 Ideally, coupling healthy
local authority with strong national power facilitates the kind of dynamic interjurisdictional synergy in
governance that makes for the most effective regulatory response—drawing on the distinctive forms of
governance capacity that develop respectively at the local and national level to solve pressing
interjurisdictional problems that require both.64
C. The Once and Future Challenges of Federalism Theory.65 With values-based competition
implicit in all federalism quandaries, each dilemma demands that decision-makers choose, consciously or
otherwise, how to prioritize among conflicting federalism values. Navigating the tension to a conclusion
usually provides good direction on the related issue of where to assign regulatory responsibility within
zones of jurisdictional overlap, or realms of governance that legitimately implicate both state and federal
authority (discussed further in Part IV). Reconciling competing values and allocating authority are
daunting tasks. Yet federalism theory—the conceptual roadmap that jurists have created over the
centuries to help interpreters meet the challenge—has not always been helpful.
To be sure, there are some easy cases, in which federal supremacy cleanly resolves a given
conflict in favor of nationalism, or a clear constitutional command resolves it in favor of localism
values.66 But even when the federal government can legally trump local initiative, does that necessarily
mean that it should? Consider the current debates over the respective state and federal roles in regulating
marijuana and immigration. In recent cases addressing these subjects, the Supreme Court affirmed that
the federal government holds trumping regulatory authority.67 But what are the competing considerations
in each context that guide your own opinion about the relative strength of state claims for input into final
regulatory policies? What theoretical tools are available to help answer these questions?
Indeed, the federalism discourse is only just beginning to appreciate how this unresolved “tug of
war” for privilege among these competing values has led to the Supreme Court’s notoriously fluctuating
federalism jurisprudence.68 Over the nation’s history, the Court, Congress, and others have experimented
63

See, e.g., EDWARD MILLICAN, ONE UNITED PEOPLE: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NATIONAL IDEA
(1990).
64
Id. at 59-66, 145-80, 265-367. See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30 (exploring
intergovernmental bargaining as a means of harnessing interjurisdictional synergy).
65
See generally Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, supra note 14 (inspiring the
title of this section).
66
Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI (federal supremacy) with U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving non-enumerated
powers to the states); compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV (conferring clear federal authority to ensure that voting
rights are not abridged on the basis of race) with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amend. XVII, art. II § 1, amend. XII
(conferring clear state responsibility for conducting congressional and presidential elections).
67
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the criminalization of intrastate marijuana growers under
the Commerce Clause); Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (affirming federal primacy in immigration law).
68
The federalism literature has exploded in recent years with interesting new perspectives on dynamic and
innovative federalism theory. While all sources are too numerous to list, a worthy tour would include RYAN, TUG
OF WAR, supra note 10, ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009); JOHN NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING
FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008); MALCOLM M. FEELEY AND EDWARD
RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan
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with various theoretical models of federalism in which one value has been uncritically elevated above the
others in importance, with corresponding costs for good governance.69 At various points, most recently
during the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism revival, the Court has grounded its federalism adjudication
in an idealized model of “dual federalism.”70 Dual federalism privileges the check-and-balance value in
idealizing a system of mutually exclusive state and federal jurisdictional spheres—notwithstanding the
marked departure of this ideal from the reality of an American system suffused with jurisdictional
overlap.71 By contrast, the preferred model of federalism during the New Deal era privileged nationalism
in service to the problem-solving value—elevating the need for strong federal power to solve critical
societal problems after the Great Depression—but with less regard for the values of checks, localism, or
accountability (and arguably fomenting the social frustration that would later lead to the modern New
Federalism and Tea Party Movements).72
Notwithstanding the ghost of dual federalism that continues to haunt the Supreme Court’s
federalism jurisprudence, the model of cooperative federalism predominates in the actual practice of
federalism-sensitive governance.73 Cooperative federalism acknowledges the reality of jurisdictional
overlap between legitimate state and federal interests, and it allows for regulatory partnerships in which
state and federal actors take responsibility for interlocking parts of a larger regulatory whole.74 This
model seeks a middle ground between the excessive jurisdictional separation of pure dual federalism and
the fear that New Deal federalism would obliterate dual sovereignty. Nevertheless, the critics of
cooperative federalism variously assail the model as overly ad hoc, undertheorized, and coercive.75
In response to shortcomings in these paradigmatic models, a host of new scholarship is
developing newer theoretical conceptions of federalism,76 including the Balanced Federalism model that I

Federalism, 127 HARVARD L. REV. 1077 (2014); Abbe Gluck, Federalism’s Domain, 123 YALE L.J. __(2014);
Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 37; Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L. J. 145 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006). More traditional and historical
perspectives are also an important part of the recent federalism discourse. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE
UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012); ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
(2010); JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION (2009); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM,
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007).
69
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 68-104 (analyzing the different theoretical models of federalism in
use over the history of American governance and jurisprudence).
70
See id. at 98-104 (reviewing dual federalism), 109-44 (analyzing the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism
revival).
71
In fact, jurisdictional overlap is so prevalent in American governance that it has been famously compared to
“marble cake,” with entangled swirls of interlocking local and national law. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar, ed., 2d ed. 1984). See also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-80
(reviewing the interjurisdictional challenge to dual federalism).
72
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 84-88 (reviewing New Deal Federalism), 98-104 (reviewing the rise
of New Federalism and the Tea Party).
73
See id.at 89-98 (reviewing cooperative federalism).
74
Id.
75
See id. at 96-98 (discussing frustration with cooperative federalism), 273-76 (discussing the federalism
safeguards debate). See also GREVE, supra note 68 (assailing cooperative federalism as coercive and collusive).
76
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, SCHAPIRO, supra note 68, GREVE, supra note 68.
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proposed in FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN.77 Balanced Federalism emphasizes dynamic
interaction among the various levels of government and shared interpretive responsibility among the three
branches of government, with the overall goal of achieving a balance among the competing federalism
values that is both dynamic and adaptive over time.78 As I describe it there, the Balanced Federalism
model involves:
“a series of innovations to bring judicial, legislative, and executive efforts to manage the tug of
war into more fully theorized focus. [Balanced Federalism] mediates the tensions within
federalism on three separate planes: (1) fostering balance among the competing federalism values,
(2) leveraging the functional capacities of the three branches of government in interpreting
federalism, and (3) maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. [This
initial foray] imagines three successive means of coping with federalism’s values tug of war, each
experimenting with different degrees of judicial and political leadership at different levels of
government. Along the way, the analysis provides clearer theoretical justification for the ways in
which the tug of war is already legitimately mediated through various forms of balancing,
compromise, and negotiation.”79

The full elaboration of Balanced Federalism in the book helps provide the missing theoretical justification
for the tools of cooperative federalism that predominate modern environmental law, as well as support for
future moves by environmental governance toward even greater dynamic engagement.80 It emphasizes
the skillful deployment of legislative, executive, and judicial capacity at each level of federalism-sensitive
governance, allocating authority based on the specific forms of decision-making in which they excel.81
In so doing, Balanced Federalism demonstrates how well-crafted multiscalar governance deflates
the pervasive presumption of “zero-sum federalism,” a misunderstanding of state-federal relations with
roots in dual federalism that continues to haunt the American discourse.82 Zero-sum conceptualizations of
federalism assume that the state and federal governments are locked in an antagonistic, winner-takes-all
competition for power, in which every victory by one side constitutes a loss for the other.83 While this is
sometimes true,84 closer examination of federalism-sensitive governance reveals that the line between
state and federal power is just as often a project of negotiation, through ongoing processes of consultation
and coordination that can accrue to the advantage of both sides.85 Several authors in this book have
highlighted the theory of negotiated federalism that is central to Balanced Federalism model as an
essential step toward more rational environmental governance.86
77

See generally RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10.
See id. at 181-214, 265-70, 339-67.
79
Id. at xi-xii.
80
See generally RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10.
81
See id.; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the Separation of
Powers both Vertically and Horizontally (A Response to Aziz Huq). COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR (forthcoming, 2015).
82
Id. at 267-68; see also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2011).
83
Id.
84
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (holding most of a state immigration statute
preempted by federal law).
85
Id. at 267-68; see also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2011).
86
See Hannah Wiseman, Evolving Energy Federalism: Current Allocations of Authority and the Need for
Inclusive Governance, supra, Chapter 6; Alice Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism and Adaptation, supra, Chapter 9.
78
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While this chapter does not further explore Balanced Federalism, it is no coincidence that the
Balanced Federalism proposal was inspired by my own experience and research of environmental
governance. Environmental law, land use planning, and public health and safety regulation address
problems in which the tensions among federalism values and the questions of who should arbitrate among
them are heightened, sometimes viscerally so.87 The pressures of jurisdictional overlap in environmental
law has driven the Supreme Court’s federalism decisions to its extremes, exposing the fault lines between
competing values that exist, if less ostentatiously, in all fields of federalism-sensitive governance.88 But
for the same reasons, environmental law can lead the way for all fields in developing innovative forms of
collaborative multiscalar governance, in which policymaking is appropriately informed by consultation,
negotiation, and compromise among all participants.
III. Environmental Federalism and the Tug of War Within
Tension among the core federalism values is especially heightened in the context of
environmental law, where compelling claims for the importance of local autonomy and tailoring are
coupled with equally compelling claims about the need for national capacity and uniformity. Concerns
over accountability, checks, and problem-solving point decision-makers in different directions. Climate
governance, other air and water pollution, coastal and forest management, wildlife protection, hazardous
waste, energy law, and related environmental fields all demonstrate the difficulties of managing these
tensions in regulatory territory where both local and national actors hold unique authority, interests,
obligations, and expertise. Intertwined with both land use law and public health and safety regulation,
environmental law implicates federalism’s tug of war within perhaps more dramatically than any other
single area of law.
Casting environmental law as the canary in the coal mine of wider federalism controversy, this
Part explores why environmental federalism disputes so often become so intense. With analysis of
current environmental challenges and examples from the Supreme Court’s environmental docket, it
examines how environmental dilemmas uniquely expose the underlying competition among good
governance values. Clashes often arise because of the way the regulatory target matches the need for
state authority to manage the local harms and benefits of particular land uses with the need for national
authority to cope with the externalities and collective action implications of those uses. The first section
illustrates these points in the context of several ongoing controversies in energy law, and the second
section explores them through the competing opinions in three noteworthy Supreme Court decisions.
A. The Canary in Federalism’s Coal Mine. Environmental law is prone to extreme federalism
controversy because it effectively allocates power in regulatory contexts where state and federal claims to
authority are simultaneously at their strongest. Environmental problems very often match a need to
regulate the harmful use of a specific parcel of land with the need to police border-crossing harms

87

Cf. Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 233 (2003).
88
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at xi.
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associated with that use.89 The state claim for regulatory priority is supported by the hallowed
understanding that governing land use is among the most sacred of local prerogatives,90 while the federal
claim is buttressed by the fact that regulating externalities is among the original predicates of national
authority.91 Criminal law and public health federalism might be fraught for similar reasons, because they
also implicate the state’s police power to regulate for health and safety, and they also portend spillover
harms to other states if poorly managed. And indeed, these realms of law are also marked by federalism
controversy, as the recent Obamacare upheaval attests.92 Yet most of the time, environmental federalism
controversies are even more heightened, for reasons that appear to hinge on the special relationship
between land use regulation and environmental law.
Conventional environmental laws regulate pollution or natural resources, but both are intertwined
with regulation of the local lands on which resources are regulated or pollution produced. Harmful land
uses must be regulated to prevent spillovers, and the failure of state environmental laws to accomplish
this before the enactment of the major federal pollution statutes in the 1970s suggests that central
authority may be necessary.93 However, the regulation of land poses questions to which the answers are
intensely more idiosyncratic—and more locally variegated—than most regulatory issues involving crime
or public health. There is widespread consensus on what constitutes health, theft, or murder; state public
health and criminal laws do differ, but mostly at the margins. By contrast, the answers to questions about
how best to regulate land use can differ radically between states, or even between neighborhoods, because
the nature of the land in question is so locally unique.
As Hirokawa & Rosenblum argue in Chapter 11, the contours of the land, soil quality, climate,
precipitation levels, elevation, prevailing winds, habitat, population density, zoning laws, and the local
economies dependent on that land will all differ dramatically from one community to the next. Managing
water pollution in Oregon, Arizona, Iowa, New York, and Florida require wholly different sets of local
expertise—you have to know what the watershed looks like, what the major stressors are, where the local
industry is operating, the seasonal weather patterns, etc.—and these will likely result in diverging, locally
tailored strategies. Moreover, bad land use decisions made without the benefit of local expertise can
portend serious environmental, cultural, and economic harm if things go wrong. Applying an
inappropriate regulatory strategy for given conditions could damage soil, water, and other local resources,
with enormous collateral consequences for entire communities. Nevertheless, if one community fails to
prevent spillover harms to another, then the stakes are equally high.
For these reasons, jurisdictional conflicts have long been part of the legal and political
controversies that erupt within the vast gray area of environmental governance. Should EPA be able to

89

See Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, supra note 14, at Part 3.1.
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (J. Powell, concurring) (identifying local
land use regulation as among the essential functions of local government).
91
See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (strongly affirming federal jurisdiction to resolve an
interstate nuisance claim over discharges by Chicago of raw sewage into the Mississippi River).
92
See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Businesses vs. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
93
See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 Md.
L. Rev. 1141, 1160 (1995) (describing the failure of state law efforts as the precursor to federal environmental law).
90
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regulate manmade irrigation ditches as wetlands?94 Can California impose costs on “dirtier” energy
imported from out-of-state?95 Should municipalities have the right to ban fracking operations?96 On the
surface, these conflicts play out as contests between state and federal jurisdiction, where each has a
legitimate claim to regulate. But environmental conflicts are especially charged because of the values
contest that extends beneath the surface task of assigning primary responsibility. Regardless of who gets
the final say, making that call requires the decision-maker to forge a path forward through the tension
among federalism’s core values—checks and balances, accountability and transparency, local autonomy,
central authority, and problem-solving synergy—each pointing regulatory response in a different
direction.
Should the primary consideration be the facilitation of interjurisdictional innovation, given
uncertainty about the best regulatory approach (an interpretation favoring values of local autonomy)?
Should the primary consideration be the need for preemptive central regulation to fully police collective
action problems that may unravel other regulatory solutions (favoring values of central authority)? Is it
the need for simultaneous local and national regulation to provide regulatory backstop and prevent
regulatory capture (favoring checks and balances)? Or is this a situation in which state and federal
regulation is needed to simultaneously manage different elements of an interjurisdictional regulatory
problem that requires both local and national capacity (favoring problem-solving synergy)? If so, how do
concerns about governmental transparency and accountability factor in?
Regulatory decision-makers navigate these conflicting values to establish a rough order of
priority, and this enables them to determine which level of governance has the best capacity to act on the
primary concerns. But in environmental law, clear answers are especially elusive. In some regulatory
contexts, the value that cries out for primacy may seem clear to most observers—for example, the need
for preemptive central authority in managing the war power. For generally accepted reasons, the armed
forces ultimately respond to only one commander in chief. But in environmental contexts, the answer is
often less clear. Sometimes the need for regulatory innovation really does clash with the need to resolve
collective action problems—as powerfully demonstrated by the challenges of climate governance. In
others, the majority of observers may firmly believe that one value clearly cries out for primacy—but they
lack consensus on exactly which one it is.
Examples abound in environmental law, especially in realms where land use factors heavily,
including the examples of nuclear waste disposal, water pollution law, coastal management, and climate
94

See EPA, Definition of Waters of the United States Under the Clean Water Act, March, 2014, available at
http://www2.epa.gov/uswaters/definition-waters-united-states-under-clean-water-act (proposed rule extending Clean
Water Act authority to, inter alia, agricultural ditches); Missouri Farm Bureau, That’s Enough (“Let it Go” Parody),
YOU TUBE, May 23, 2014, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0OqJqNbbs&feature=youtu.be (video
parody of Disney Film, FROZEN, criticizing the rule’s application to agricultural ditches).
95
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) cert denied 134 S. Ct. 2875
(2014) (overturning the lower court’s conclusion that California’s “lifecycle analysis” of imported fuel’s carbon
intensity unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce in energy).
96
Compare Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, ___ A.3d ___, 2013 WL 6687290 (Pa. 2013) (upholding
municipal rights to regulate fracking under the state constitution) with Colorado Oil & Gas Assn. v. City of Fort
Collins, ___P.3d ___, 2014 (case number 13CV31385, Larimer County District Court, Aug. 7, 2014) (holding a
local fracking ban preempted by contrary state law).
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governance discussed further below. But for an initial example, consider how the tension among
federalism values manifests in several ongoing challenges for energy law.
(1) Federalism Tension in Energy Policy. Federalism-sensitive energy law dilemmas include
how to allocate authority over different aspects of energy harvest and infrastructure; how to share state
and federal oversight of energy pricing and transmission; and how to appropriately structure energy
markets to respect different realms of local, state, and federal prerogative. Energy law pits federalism’s
underlying values against one another as intensively as any other realm of environmental law, and in
many respects more interestingly—because intergovernmental conflicts here are as likely to arise between
local and state government as they are between state and federal government.
As Hannah Wiseman explains in Chapter 6, most energy governance takes place at the state and
local levels, which maintain primary authority over the siting and operation of instate energy facilities and
markets. States remain the primary regulators of oil and gas drilling operations and electric utilities, a
jurisdictional realm explicitly preserved by the Federal Power Act.97 In general, states regulate the
intrastate elements of the energy industry (including production and retail sales), while the federal
government regulates the interstate elements (including interstate transmission and wholesale pricing),
mostly through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.98 Drawing on federal authority over
interstate commerce, the Commission oversees interstate energy markets and wholesale rate-making,
interstate oil and gas pipelines and other fuels transportation, liquefied natural gas terminals, hydropower
projects, and reviews certain mergers, acquisitions, and corporate transactions by electric companies.99
State agencies regulate virtually all else (except nuclear power plants, under the separate jurisdiction of
the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission).100
Recently, federalism litigation has arisen over the extent to which state Renewable Portfolio
Standards, carbon-intensity preferences, and other creative means of promoting sustainable energy use
within state markets are preempted by federal authority under the dormant Commerce Clause. These
policies capitalize on the regulatory innovation and interjurisdictional competition that local autonomy
enables within federalism’s laboratory of ideas, all in the service of solving critical problems associated
with climate change, energy independence, and environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, they come
into heated conflict with claims for the preeminent value of central authority to promote free markets and
national uniformity in interstate commerce.
For example, in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, the Ninth Circuit recently upheld
California regulations favoring low carbon-intensity fuels against a claim that they unconstitutionally
regulated extraterritorial production, finding that they did not facially discriminate against out-of-state

97

16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824a-824w (2012) (distinguishing state and federal roles in regulating electric utilities).
See, e.g., James J. Hoecker and Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric
Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 Energy L.J. 71 (2014) (arguing that the distinctions are blurring).
99
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, What FERC Does, at http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last
updated June 24, 2014) (listing agency responsibilities and distinguishing the related responsibilities of state and
other federal agencies).
100
Id.
98
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production.101 Overturning a contrary conclusion by the lower court, the panel was persuaded by the
localism values of innovation and competition, essentially holding that California was entitled to
experiment with regulatory means of avoiding serious harms from climate change to its citizens, and that
any interstate burden was justified by the fact that the formula accurately measured carbon intensity.102
Highlighting the clash of values, however, a strongly stated dissent defended the importance of national
uniformity and unfettered interstate commerce notwithstanding respect for California’s “long history of
innovative solutions to complicated environmental problems.”103 Advocates for California’s rule praised
the decision’s reasoning, while critics called it “a thin veil attempting to mask a result-based
conclusion.”104 The Supreme Court denied review.105
Nevertheless, perhaps the most interesting dilemmas of energy law include intrastate
controversies over where, how, and whether to harvest different sources of energy when state and local
preferences conflict. As Professor Wiseman describes, both traditional and renewable energy harvest are
land-use intensive in ways that can disproportionately disperse the costs and benefits of extraction,
leading to community protest.106 For example, sprawling solar and wind power operations lay claim to
large surface areas that can interfere with wildlife and community aesthetics. Citing harm to scenic
resources and migratory birds, Massachusetts residents have unsuccessfully sought to block the
establishment of a large offshore wind farm off the coast of Cape Cod.107 Controversy over the siting of
transmission facilities, including the proposed XL Pipeline, further embroils all levels of government in
conflicts in which state and local interests are not always aligned.108
More poignantly, the drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fracking) of oil and gas wells has led to
divisive regulatory conflicts between state and local interests. Local opposition to fracking, which can
cause troubling air and water pollution,109 has spawned a series of clashes between municipalities seeking
to ban it and state efforts to preempt the local bans. In 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated
state efforts to preempt a local fracking ban under the state’s Environmental Rights Amendment, an
expanded and constitutionalized version of the public trust doctrine.110 By contrast, two district courts in
101

730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (overturning the lower court’s conclusion
that California’s “lifecycle analysis” of imported fuel’s carbon intensity unconstitutionally burdens interstate
commerce in energy).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1108, 1110 (Murguia, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
104
Jonathan Marsh, Ninth Circuit Holds that “California's Regulatory Experiment” Does Not Discriminate
Against Out-of-State Ethanol and Crude Oil Producers, KING & SPAULDING ENERGY NEWSLETTER, October 2013,
available at http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/EnergyNewsletter/2013/October/article5.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2014).
105
See 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
106
See Hannah Wiseman, Evolving Energy Federalism, supra Chapter 6.
107
See, e.g., Jeremy Fox, Federal Judge Dismisses Cape Wind Lawsuit, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2014, available
at http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/03/district-court-judge-dismisses-suit-block-cape-windproject/hiMjvDh22jsc10fqRPNV3N/story.html (reporting on local opposition to a large offshore wind project).
108
See Vann, supra note 3 (discussing XL Pipeline controversy).
109
See, e.g., Jason Morris, Texas Family Plagued with Ailments gets $3M in 1st-of-Its-Kind Fracking Judgment,
CNN, April 26, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/25/justice/texas-family-wins-fracking-lawsuit/ (reporting on a
successful private nuisance suit).
110
Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, ___ A.3d ___, 2013 WL 6687290 (Pa. 2013).
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Colorado have concluded that local bans by the Cities of Fort Collins and Longmont are preempted by the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act.111 The Colorado controversy prompted a widely reported
dispute between state and local interests leading up to the 2014 election, involving multiple competing
ballot initiatives about local authority over fracking operations, culminating in a state task force to
reconsider the extent of state and local authority over fracking and other locally sensitive energy
extraction.112
The recent fracking controversies demonstrate an important disjuncture that the federalism
debates often mask: the occasionally stark gap between state and local interests. Pure constitutional
federalism presumes a false identity between state and municipal interests in vindicating localism values.
The Constitution treats the state as the “local” branch of government, a historical conceit that is barely
defensible in application to Wyoming (population: 576,412) or Delaware (land area: 2,489 square miles)
and laughable in application to California (population: 37,253,956; land area: 163,695 square miles).113
Effectively balancing localism values with other good governance values ultimately requires multiscalar
governance with greater sensitivity to the distinction between state and local interests than is enabled by
the more simplistic models of dual federalism and even cooperative federalism.114
More specifically, federalism tension arises in the fracking disputes between values of localism,
centralized authority at both the state and federal level, and checks on sovereign authority. Fracking,
wind farm, and pipeline controversies implicate core localism values regarding a community’s right to
self-determine local land uses and economic opportunities, with different municipalities reaching different
conclusions about the kinds of communities they want to live in. Yet they also implicate competing
values of centralized state and/or federal authority to protect larger scale public interests in stable access
to affordable supply, environmentally sustainable production, or transmission safety. In addition, the
virtually unlimited ability of most states to preempt or control conflicting municipal choices—vastly more
powerful than the ability of the federal government to control the states—raises troubling questions about
the protection of checks and balances between local and centralized power within states, a problem that is
constitutionally invisible in the general federalism discourse.
B. Environmental Federalism and the Supreme Court. With such embedded tension at play,
environmental cases are often among the most contentious on the docket. Judicial federalism analyses in
environmental conflicts often fracture into multiple opinions, revealing greater theoretical instability than
other areas of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence. However, they are valuable to the overall
111

Colorado Oil & Gas Assn. v. City of Fort Collins, ___P.3d ___, 2014 (case number 13CV31385, Larimer
County District Court, Aug. 7, 2014). Two weeks earlier, on July 24, 2014, the Boulder County District Court held
the City of Longmont’s hydraulic fracturing ban was similarly preempted.
112
Bradley Olson and Jennifer Oldham, Colorado Fracking Opponents Losing Local Control Fight,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-04/colorado-governor-strikes-deal-seenavoiding-fracking-curbs.html (reporting on ballot initiatives and a new state task force in Colorado).
113
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto
Rico: April 1, 2010-July 1, 2012, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/totals/2012/tables/NST-EST201201.xls+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (providing state population statistics); U.S. Census Bureau, State Area
Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, available at https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/state-area.html
(providing state area measurements).
114
See, e.g., Gerken, Osofsky, Resnik, and Davidson sources cited supra note 37.
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study of American federalism for exactly this reason—and especially so because they leave such a clear
paper trail, providing unparalleled windows into individual justices’ efforts to grapple with the underlying
tensions. Contrasting judicial analyses prioritize competing values differently, revealing federalism’s
fault lines in ways that mainstream economic regulation rarely does.115 Famous environmental decisions
invalidating state-led efforts to cope with radioactive waste,116 limiting federal authority over intrastate
wetlands,117 and even allowing a state to force more thoughtful federal climate governance118 all highlight
environmental federalism’s tug of war within. They also suggest weaknesses in the Court’s preferred
theoretical tools for managing jurisdictional overlap within a fuller conception of federalism.119
(1) New York vs. United States and Radioactive Waste Management. New York v. United States,
the controversial environmental case that inaugurated the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism revival of
dual federalism ideals, offers a vivid example of federalism values in conflict.120 In New York, the Court
invalidated key parts of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, the statutory product of state-led
efforts to more safely and equitably manage mounting streams of nuclear waste.121 With few proper
disposal facilities, hazardous waste was being stored without adequate safety precautions or shipped
thousands of miles to the few states with open disposal sites.122 Proposed to Congress by the National
Governors Association, the Act required all states to share equitably in the burden of waste management
by rotating responsibility within regional interstate compacts.123 New York initially advocated for the
Act, but later challenged it when it failed to identify a local disposal site.124 When the majority agreed
that the Act’s enforcement provisions coerced state action in violation of the Tenth Amendment, it
dismantled decades of negotiations between state and federal actors to resolve a critical public safety
issue that, as a result, remains largely unresolved today.125
New York remains among the most famous federalism decisions of the twentieth century, setting
forth the anti-commandeering doctrine that became a regular basis on which to challenge other programs
of cooperative federalism (though usually unsuccessfully).126 It also showcases many of the features that
position environmental law as such a powerful federalism exemplar. Safe and equitable waste disposal
draws on simultaneously strong local and national regulatory interests, requiring state land use authority
to site local disposal facilities and national authority over interstate commerce and spillover harm. Siting
a toxic waste dump implicates core aspects of local governance, including land use planning that protects
115

See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-46.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
117
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006).
118
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
119
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 7-17, 30-33.
120
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
121
Id. at 187-88.
122
See also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 215-30.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 215-41 (discussing the evolution of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act partially invalidated in
New York and the chaos that ensued after the decision). See also Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 COLORADO L. REV. 1 (2010)
(same).
126
505 U.S. at 187-88. See also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 199 n. 35 (reporting more than 70 such
challenges filed in the first fourteen years after New York was decided.)
116
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public safety and empowers citizens to create the kinds of communities they want to live in. (Indeed,
New York State challenged the law it had once supported precisely because it could not find a
municipality willing to host a disposal site.) Yet the problem also implicates critical aspects of national
governance, including centralized authority to impose uniform obligations when needed to resolve
collective action problems among the states. In this case, the states voluntarily sacrificed some local
autonomy when they partnered with Congress to create the intergovernmental synergy that they believed
was necessary to solve an ominous environmental problem they had failed to manage on their own.
The opposing arguments of the justices themselves provide the best evidence of the intense
competition among underlying federalism values. Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion was driven by
explicit concerns over accountability and checks on sovereign authority. She argued that the
intergovernmental partnership impermissibly compromised accountability, openly worrying that voters
might not understand whether to hold state or federal representatives accountable for the results.127 She
also appealed to the importance of checks and balances in maintaining that state consent to the initial
partnership was immaterial, because a state’s sovereign authority against federal incursion was an
inalienable right of its citizens that the state cannot waive.128 Justice White vociferously opposed the
majority’s analysis, focusing on values of local autonomy, central authority, and problem-solving
synergy. He would have upheld the law in affirmation of local autonomy, respecting the state’s ability to
bind itself to a regulatory promise, and of the central authority needed to give the interstate agreement
binding legal force.129 His opinion further stressed the importance of regulatory synergy between local
capacity (to site waste disposal facilities) and national capacity (to prevent free-riders) in resolving the
hazardous waste crisis.130
(2) Rapanos v. United States and Water Pollution. Since then, the Court has continued to issue
divisive environmental decisions, several suggesting that federal regulation may be approaching the limits
of federal authority under the Commerce Clause.131 In the most recent, Rapanos v. United States, a
private landowner successfully challenged the reach of federal Clean Water Act authority over certain
127

505 U.S. at 168.
505 U.S. at 180-82 (“How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty
when state officials consented to the statute’s enactment? The answer follows from an understanding of the
fundamental purpose served by our Government’s federal structure. The Constitution does not protect the
sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the
benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’). See also RYAN, TUG
OF WAR, supra note 10, at 231-41, and Ryan, supra note 125, 39-64 (critiquing this analysis).
129
Id. at 196-97 (White, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that “these statutes are best understood as the
products of collective state action, rather than as impositions placed on States by the Federal Government. [New
York clearly signified] assent to the agreement achieved among the States as codified in these laws…. As it was
undertaking these initial steps to honor the interstate compromise embodied in the 1985 Act, New York continued to
take full advantage of the import concession made by the sited States, by exporting its low-level radioactive waste
for the full 7-year extension period provided in the 1985 Act. By gaining these benefits and complying with certain
of the Act’s 1985 deadlines, therefore, New York fairly evidenced its acceptance of the federal-state arrangements”).
130
Id. at 196-97.
131
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531
U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006).
128
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intrastate wetlands, including those connected to navigable waters by manmade channels or separated by
artificial berms.132 The court’s rationale for limiting federal jurisdiction was splintered among four
opinions, none of which commanded a solid enough majority to issue a clear principle for state and
federal regulators to follow. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion explicitly invoked dual federalism theory to
limit federal assertions of jurisdiction over remote and altered wetlands,133 while Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion focused on the need to scientifically establish a hydrological connection to navigable
waters in each individual enforcement action.134
With its multiplicity of conflicting opinions and unclear mandate for future regulation, Rapanos
may rank among the least helpful Supreme Court decisions of all time. The jurisdictional uncertainty left
in is wake has substantially altered enforcement of the statute and arguably led to declining water quality
nationwide.135 A major investigation several years after Rapanos found that regulators had abandoned
nearly 1,500 water pollution investigations because establishing jurisdiction was too difficult, timeconsuming, or expensive.136 Eight years later, as this book goes to press, federal agencies are attempting
to promulgate new rules to replace those Rapanos invalidated,137 but the process has been politically
strained and fraught by uncertainty about what the Court will approve in the inevitable next round of
litigation.138 This uncertainty reflects the multiplicity of views on the Court to this point, which itself
reflects the underlying turmoil among competing good governance values.

132

547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (rejecting the federal agency’s interpretation of the CWA for infringing on
traditional state control over land and water use and pushing the limits of congressional commerce power).
133
Id. at 737-38 (noting that “the Government’s expansive interpretation would ‘result in a significant
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use’).
134
Id. at 780-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135
See, e.g., Mark Berman, Toledo’s Water Ban and the Sensitivity of Our Water Systems, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/04/toledos-water-ban-and-the-sensitivity-ofour-drinking-systems/ (reporting on recent drinking water bans in major metropolitan areas across the nation as a
result of harmful water pollution); Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, At a Cost in Suffering, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on
the results of an extensive review of water pollution records showing that “in recent years, violations of the Clean
Water Act have risen steadily across the nation”); Toxic Waters Project: A Series About the Worsening Pollution in
American Waters, and Regulators’ Response, N.Y. TIMES, August 2009 - March, 2010,
http://projects.nytimes.com/toxic-waters (a collection of reports on the subject).
136
See Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Foiling EPA, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2010, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/us/01water.html?emc=eta (also noting indications by that EPA
officials that they may be “unable to prosecute as many as half of the nation’s largest known polluters because
officials lack jurisdiction or because proving jurisdiction would be overwhelmingly difficult or time consuming”);
Jeff Kinney, Internal EPA Memo Finds Enforcement Decreased Following Rapanos Decision, 39 Env’t Rep.
(BNA) 1392 (2008).
137
EPA, Definition of Waters of the United States Under the Clean Water Act, March, 2014, available at
http://www2.epa.gov/uswaters/definition-waters-united-states-under-clean-water-act. A final rule is expected in
2015.
138
Cf. Lawrence Liebesman, Elizabeth Lake, and Joanna Meldrum, Obama Administration Releases Proposed
Rule on “Waters of the United States,,” Holland & Knight, April 4, 2014,
http://www.hklaw.com/publications/obama-administration-releases-proposed-rule-on-waters-of-the-united-states04-04-2014/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (extensive analysis of the proposed rule by an industry-side law firm
warning that the rule “is unprecedented in its reach and scope,” “has received broad praise from environmentalists,”
and that clients should engage policymakers to “lessen[] the impact on the regulated community.”). See also
Missouri Farm Bureau (“Let it Go” Parody), supra note 94 (urging members to fight the proposed rule).

21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532687

Erin Ryan

Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within

8/20/2014

Like the regulation of radioactive waste disposal, the environmental dilemma in Rapanos pits
local interests in land use sovereignty against federal interests in protecting the nation’s waterways and
preventing the boundary-crossing harm of water pollution. Its various opinions are also marked by
consideration of competing values, though because it is primarily a statutory interpretation case, they are
featured less forthrightly than in the explicit federalism dialogues of New York. Still, Justice Scalia
focused on localism and check-and-balance values in limiting the expansion of federal authority beyond
the traditional boundary of navigability, while Justice Kennedy was willing to privilege central authority
and problem-solving values when extended federal jurisdiction is proved necessary to achieve the
statutory goal of preventing water pollution. Justice Kennedy acknowledges the tension explicitly, noting
that “[t]he possibility of legitimate Commerce Clause and federalism concerns in some circumstances
does not require the adoption of an interpretation that departs in all cases from the Act’s [commitment to
resolving water pollution].”139 Dissenting arguments by Justices Stevens and Breyer pull in still different
directions, favoring deference to federal interpretive authority on the need for a centralized response to
resolve a clearly interjurisdictional problem.140
(3) Massachusetts vs. EPA and Climate Change. While not overtly a federalism decision, even
the famous Massachussets v. EPA climate change decision speaks to the fractious relationship between
state and federal authority in the realm of environmental law.141 There, a sharply divided Court allowed
the state standing to force EPA’s reconsideration of regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act,
on grounds that EPA’s failure to adequately justify its inaction harmed state sovereign authority over
threatened coastal lands.142 Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in an environmental federalism case
of the previous century, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that “the State has an interest independent
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”143
More than any other area of environmental law, climate governance intersects local, state, federal,
and even international claims to regulatory authority and obligation where they are strongest. With
greenhouse gases from all parts of the world mixing evenly in the upper atmosphere, it is the
quintessential collective action problem in which centralized authority is necessary to police free-riders
and prevent boundary-crossing harms. Yet human contributions to climate change spans virtually the
entire range of human activity—from personal decisions about diet and transportation, to municipal
building codes, to state energy policy, to federal tax incentives, to international treaty making. Some
contributions to climate change are more easily regulated than others, and some modifications more easily
encouraged, but as Bill Buzbee, Kirsten Engel, and Alice Kaswan argue in Part III, effective climate
governance requires coordinated efforts at all levels.
Indeed, Justice Holmes’ famous passage points to the grand dilemma for environmental
federalism more generally. In a nutshell, it is that both the federal and state governments have regulatory
139

547 U.S. 715, at 783 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that his “view of the statute rests
in part upon the nature of the problem”).
141
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
142
Id.
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Id. at 518-20 (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
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interests and obligations regarding their citizens’ ability to enjoy a clean, safe, and productive
environment for generations to come. Environmental problems like radioactive waste, water pollution,
and climate change pair local land use problems with border-crossing public health and safety problems.
Like the problems with which energy law grapples, they cannot be resolved without partnering elements
of state-specific expertise and authority with corresponding elements of national capacity. And while
constitutional federalism sees the issue only in terms of state and national governance, the challenges of
multiscalar governance goes far deeper, extending into the productive possibilities for regulation at the
local, regional, and international level as well, in various permutations and combinations.144
The grand project for federalism and multiscalar regulation more generally is to figure out how
these different levels of government can best work together in realms of jurisdictional overlap. The
following Part explores how environmental law has responded to the challenge.
IV. The Response of Environmental Governance
Having analyzed the rip tides of federalism that so complicate environmental law, the chapter
now turns to the question of how environmental governance has risen to meet the challenge, reviewing
specific adaptations within programs of environmental federalism to cope with jurisdictional overlap.
While the dilemmas of environmental federalism are divisive for reasons that run deep among the
underlying values of good governance, they surface in the jurisdictional disputes that erupt regularly in
environmental law. As discussed in Part II, zones of overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdiction
complicate the administration of federalism-sensitive governance in ways that earlier theories of
federalism did not always comprehend.145 As a theoretical matter, jurisdictional overlap is the formal
result of the underlying conflicts within federalism-sensitive governance, where implicated values are
sometimes best served by state and local regulation just as others are best served by national action. As a
practical matter, jurisdictional overlap provides the framework within which different levels of
government advocate for their distinct concerns and a platform for their coordinated response.
Nevertheless, contests for regulatory dominance within realms of jurisdictional overlap often lead
to divisive federalism controversies, requiring sensitive response from environmental governance.
Sometimes dilemmas arise because of the way environmental law wrestles with newly identified
problems, such as climate change, where there is no historically settled answer to the question of where
primary regulatory authority should be seated (contrasted with, say, land use planning, historically
regarded as a local matter). Other times, the evidence increasingly reveals that even problems once
presumed to be essentially “local” in nature—such as water allocation, waste disposal, and even land use
planning—have important regional, national, or even international dimensions. At the same time, such
seemingly “national” problems as energy policy, telecommunications, and even international relations are
increasingly bound up with the exercise of state authority over local land use and natural resource
management. The ideal seat of regulatory authority over these matters is often hotly contested.

144
145

See sources cited supra note 30.
See supra, text accompanying notes 65-75.
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Environmental law has contended with jurisdictional controversy by experimenting with the
available tools of cooperative federalism, exploring variations that might enable the right balance of
flexibility, durability, and responsiveness to address each particular constellation of concerns. This Part
explores how environmental law deals with the challenges of jurisdictional overlap that are present in all
federalism dilemmas but endemic in environmental governance. After reviewing the classic challenges of
jurisdictional separation and unstructured overlap, it reveals how environmental federalism has adapted
contrasting structures of intergovernmental coordination, including models of coordinated capacity,
federally supported state implementation, conditional preemption, and shared and general permitting
programs.
A. The Problem of Jurisdictional Overlap. Environmental law is hardly unique among realms of
governance that include a zone of concurrent state and federal regulatory jurisdiction, but it does so in an
especially palpable way. Jurisdictional overlap arises in regulatory contexts where both the federal and
state governments have legitimate regulatory interests or obligations simultaneously.146 Federal interests
are created by constitutional delegations of federal responsibility, while state interests arise from the
reservoir of police power that is constitutionally reserved to the states.147 However, distinct state and
federal regulatory mandates are often triggered by related or interdependent areas of law, creating an
“interjurisdictional gray area” between clearer areas of primarily state or federal prerogative.148
There are, to be sure, areas of relative jurisdictional clarity within American dual sovereignty.
The Constitution plainly enumerates some powers specifically to the federal government, such as the
powers to declare war and manage foreign relations, while explicitly reserving others to the states, such as
the authority to manage federal elections.149 But even the states’ exclusive constitutional obligation to
manage elections collides with exclusive federal obligations to interpret the voting rights of citizens
casting ballots in those elections.150 And increasingly, states are engaging in regulatory activities with
ramifications for the nation’s conduct of international relations,151 some of which the federal government
has tolerated (including several international subnational climate governance partnerships)152 and some of
which it has not.153
146

RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-80.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.; see also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 1-33 (discussing indeterminacy
among the details of constitutional delegations).
148
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-80; see also Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War
Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007) (providing the
initial impetus for the fuller theoretical exposition in the book, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10).
149
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8 (empowering Congress to declare war); art. I, sec. 4 (delegating responsibility for
the mechanics of congressional elections to state legislatures).
150
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (promising the equal protection of the laws); amend. XV (promising that voting
rights will not be abridged on account of race); amend. XIX (promising that voting rights will not be abridged on
account of sex). See also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (overturning state electoral decisions in a presidential
election on federal equal protection grounds, though in a decision famously confining its reasoning to its facts).
151
See e.g., Gerken, Osofsky, Resnik, and Davidson sources cited supra note 37.
152
In the West, California has joined four Canadian provinces to form the Western Climate Initiative, a carbon
trading partnership. See, e.g., Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/milestones (last
visited Aug. 10, 2014). In the Midwest, six states and one Canadian province formed the Midwest Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Accord, pledging to establish a multi-sector cap-and-trade system to meet regional greenhouse gas
reduction targets. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional147
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Even seemingly simple delegations of exclusive authority can reveal jurisdictional overlap in
application. For example, bankruptcy law is explicitly delegated to the federal government, but its actual
administration relies on legal definitions of property provided by state law.154 Although the federal
commerce power implies a navigational servitude across all navigable waters in the United States,155 the
submerged lands beneath many of them are considered property of the states, held in trust for their
citizens, under the public trust and equal footing doctrines.156 With so many avenues for regulatory
overlap, the interjurisdictional gray area runs deep in American law, from environmental law to criminal
law to national security to financial services regulation and beyond.157
Still, the gray area is especially visceral in the environmental context. As noted in Part III,
jurisdictional overlap is common here because so many environmental problems partner the need for (1)
local land use regulation, to control the actual source of the harm at issue, with (2) federal authority, often
under the Commerce Clause, to prevent locally uncontrolled harm from spilling over into neighboring
jurisdictions that lack direct regulatory authority over the source of the harm.158 Consider the prevention
of water pollution. The best way of preventing harmful stream sedimentation by a local construction
project is probably through the municipal construction permitting process (as EPA itself recognizes in its
Clean Water Act regulations for preventing stormwater pollution by constructing sites).159 But if the state
or its local subdivisions fail to regulate that pollution, it can cause problems for downstream communities
in other states that lack the means to control out-of-state activity. Federal authority is needed to effectuate
the ability of these others states to perform their traditional police power obligations to protect the health
and safety of their own citizens.
climate-initiatives/mggra (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). However, although a Model Rule was produced in 2010 and
the accord formally remains in effect, “the participating states are no longer pursuing it.” Id.
153
For example, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000), the Supreme Court
invalidated a Massachusetts law that prohibited state and local actors from purchasing goods or services from
companies doing business with the nation of Burma, also known as Myanmar, on grounds that the state law
undermined the President’s ability to conduct diplomacy. Similarly, the Court invoked the dormant foreign affairs
power to invalidate a California law mandating public disclosure of instate insurance companies’ holocaust policies,
which had been enacted so that consumers could patronize companies that had rectified Nazi-era practices (when
many had failed to honor the policies of Jewish holders). Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 417-20
(2003).
154
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (delegating bankruptcy administration to the federal government); Felicia Anne
Nadborny, Note, “Leap of Faith” into Bankruptcy: An Examination of the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a
Catholic Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839, 889 (2005) (discussing the role of state law).
155
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954) (describing how the
Commerce Clause creates a dominant servitude to regulate navigation).
156
See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (affirming application of the commonlaw public trust doctrine to state ownership of the submerged lands beneath the navigable waters of the Great
Lakes); PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (recognizing the general rule of state ownership of
submerged lands under the public trust doctrine).
157
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-80.
158
See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
159
OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: FACT SHEET 2.1, at 2 (2005),
http://www.epa.gov.npdes/pubs/fact2-1.pdf (discussing the Phase II Rule); OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STORMWATER
PHASE II FINAL RULE: FACT SHEET 2.9, at 3 (2005), http://www.epa/gov/npdes/pubs/fact2-9.pdf (discussing the
conferral of municipal discretion under the general permit system); Environmental Defense Center v. EPA, 344 F.3d
832, 845-46 & n.20 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the Phase II Rule’s regulation of construction site sedimentation).
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With so many independent but overlapping sovereign interests, uncertainty can arise over which
sovereign should be able to make which regulatory choices—the “who decides?” jurisdictional question
at the heart of federalism dilemmas.160 This uncertainty breeds additional controversy within federalismsensitive governance that is already implicitly struggling with the tension among conflicting federalism
values. Notably, jurisdictional uncertainty can arise both when we manage the problem by attempting to
separate regulatory authority along bright jurisdictional lines, and also when we explicitly recognize
overlapping local and national jurisdiction. Federalism dilemmas are thus marked by two different kinds
of uncertainty: what happens after we draw a jurisdictional line, and what happens when we don’t.161
In contexts of true overlap, the uncertainty resulting from efforts at jurisdictional line-drawing
creates the more obvious problem. For example, as Blake Hudson describes in Chapter 4, managing
forest resources at the local level provided short-term order but long-term difficulties as spillover issues
eventually transcend local jurisdictional boundaries. The uncertainty that results from a decision not to
draw jurisdictional lines is perhaps more the interesting problem, creating different challenges and
opportunities for interjurisdictional governance. For example, the authors in Part III provide sophisticated
analyses of the different challenges and opportunities of multiscalar climate governance. Meanwhile, the
classical model of cooperative federalism splits some of these differences, eschewing both strict
jurisdictional lines and unstructured regulatory overlap. The following discussion visits these three
separate approaches to managing jurisdictional overlap.
(1) Untangling Jurisdictional Separation. Federalism uncertainty often arises about the actual
boundary line between state and federal authority, in contexts where a bright line of separation seems
important. For example, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court recently reviewed state
immigration legislation that, among other provisions, required immigrants to carry documentation of their
immigration status at all times and punished those who hire or shelter the undocumented.162
Distinguishing legitimate local regulation from exclusively federal authority, the Court invalidated all
provisions except one (allowing state police to investigate immigration status under specified
conditions).163
160

See, e.g., WILLIAM BUZBEE, ED., PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S
CORE QUESTION (2011).
161
See Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, supra note 14, at Part 2 (discussing the
two kinds of uncertainty).
162
132 S. Ct. at 2497-98. Arizona argued that the law was a necessary assertion of its police power to protect
local communities, while the Department of Justice argued that the law exceeded the state’s legitimate role, usurped
federal authority to regulate immigration, and critically undermined U.S. foreign policy objectives. Id.; Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Citing Conflict with Federal Law, Department of Justice Challenges
Arizona Immigration Law (July 6, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-opa-776.html.
163
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (invalidating provisions allowing state police to arrest individuals
on suspicion of undocumented status and criminalizing the presence and work of undocumented immigrants in the
state, while upholding a provision enabling state police to investigate immigration status under certain
circumstances). See also United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (granting in part and
denying in part a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the state’s new immigration law); Georgia Latino
Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1267 (2012) (holding that sections of the
Georgia immigration law were preempted by federal law); Stella B. Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74
Ohio St. L.J. 703 (2013) (discussing federalism issues in immigration law).
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Environmental law has struggled with issues of jurisdictional separation since its inception. For
example, as Rapanos demonstrates, line-drawing uncertainty has plagued decades of rulemaking about
the boundary between state and federal reach over wetlands regulation relating to water pollution
control.164 The location of that boundary will determine when a landowner must seek permission to fill
wetlands that are not directly subject to the Clean Water Act, but which may bear a relationship to
pollution in other waterways that are subject. After the Solid Waste Agency of Cook County, IL,
successfully sued to invalidate federal authority over hydrologically isolated wetlands,165 the issue of
what would constitute a jurisdictional connection embroiled the Supreme Court in the Rapanos decision
that failed to produce clear regulatory direction despite four separate opinions.166 As noted above, years
of regulatory turmoil that have followed, in which enforcement efforts have plummeted and water quality
has degraded.167 Federal agencies are accepting comment on a proposed rule to clarify jurisdiction after
the two wetlands cases, but whatever emerges will almost certainly invite further legal challenge.168
(2) Untangling Jurisdictional Collaboration. Other federalism-sensitive contexts are more
tolerant of concurrent jurisdiction and less committed to jurisdictional line-drawing, demonstrated by
broadly overlapping state and federal roles in criminal law,169 or even cooperative state-federal
management of the national highway system.170 But environmental law provides the most interesting
examples, from realms in which state and federal actors regulate separately in related legal territory (such
as energy law, discussed above in Part III), to complex programs of cooperative federalism that require
deference to both state and federal concerns in different circumstances (discussed further below in Part
IV). In areas where concurrent jurisdiction is the norm, less energy is spent resolving the proper spheres
of state and federal authority on either side of a bright-line boundary, because no such boundary exists.
However, uncertainty here arises over whose judgment should prevail when simultaneously operating
state and federal choices conflict. When both have a role to play, the federalism question shifts from the
relatively simpler “who gets to decide?” to the vexing permutation “whose decision trumps?” Should
national objectives preempt, or should local priorities prevail?171
164

See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 151-53, 160-62 (discussing the interjurisdictional problem of water
pollution and recent controversy in wetlands regulation).
165
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001)
(limiting federal authority over “hydrologically isolated” wetlands).
166
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (casting further doubt on the reach of federal regulatory
authority over wetlands without direct surface connections to navigable waters). Strictly speaking, Solid Waste
Agency and Rapanos were both statutory decisions interpreting the Clean Water Act. However, the Justices and
their observers clearly understood their task of statutory interpretation as taking place in the looming shadow of
ongoing debate over the reach of federal Commerce Clause authority.
167
See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
168
Cf. Liebesman, et al, supra note 138.
169
See Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86
B.U. L. REV. 65, 104–06 (2006); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541,
1553 (2002).
170

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (June 29, 1956) (creating a National
Highway System jointly administered by the states and federal government).
171
E.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130,
172-73 (2005) (questioning increasing federalization of environmental regulation formerly within state prerogative);
Logan, supra note 169, at 104–06 (questioning the increasing federalization of criminal law).
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The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause affirms that the legitimate exercise of federal authority can
always trump conflicting state law,172 but federal law often leaves purposeful space for local participation
even when Congress could theoretically preempt an entire regulatory field—especially in environmental
law.173 Notwithstanding enumerated federal authority over commerce and the channels of interstate
commerce, international treaties and foreign relations, federal property, military readiness, national
security, and others,174 Congress usually leaves space for local participation to engage regulatory
expertise or capacity that local governments have, but the federal government does not.175 For that
reason, the more difficult preemption question in these contexts is not whether the federal government
could preempt, but whether (and to what degree) it should.176
Ongoing dilemmas about federal scope and restraint in environmental law—from wetlands to
forests to air pollution regulation—demonstrate the force with which federalism and preemption
controversies preoccupy American governance.177 In some realms of open jurisdictional overlap, such as
education178 and health care law,179 a significant federal presence is matched by trumping local authority,
usually because the federal presence has been purchased with the federal spending power and is

172

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-180, 271-314 (reviewing regulatory realms in which the
federal government invites state involvement even though it could legitimately preempt the field, including many
fields of environmental law).
174
U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8 (enumerating most of Congress’s constitutionally delegated authority).
175
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 326-38 (discussing reasons federal actors cede authority to local
actors); Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30 (providing additional source information for these
conclusions).
176
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 339-67; cf. William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 NYU L Rev. 1547 (2007) (discussing the advantages of narrowly
tailored “floor preemption”, which enables state discretion to exceed a federal standard, over the alternative “unitary
federal choice” or “ceiling preemption,” which does not); Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (discussing the advantages of declining to fully preempt state discretion within a
national program of air pollution prevention).
177
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 132-41.
178
See, e.g., Benton Martin, An Increased Role for the Department of Education in Addressing Federalism
Concerns, 2012 BYU Educ. & L.J. 79, 81-84 (2012) (discussing the role of state and federal actors over the history
of American education law). Education federalism issues have recently erupted over the Common Core, a set of
curricular goals created by a partnership of states that were initially embraced by nearly every state. However, some
states are now withdrawing from the initiative amid criticism that federal support for the standards represent federal
overreach into a realm of state sovereignty. See, e.g., Nancy M. Jackson, Core Withdrawal? Some States Seem to be
Reconsidering their Common Core Commitments, Scholastic Administrator, Summer 2013, available at
http://www.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp?id=3757959 (last visited August 12, 2014) (listing states that have
recently withdrawn from the common core standards); Lyndsey Layton, How Bill Gates Pulled Off the Swift
Common Core Revolution, WASH. POST, June 7, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/howbill-gates-pulled-off-the-swift-common-core-revolution/2014/06/07/a830e32e-ec34-11e3-9f5c9075d5508f0a_story.html (noting emerging federalism controversy over the Common Core standards).
179
See, e.g., Brietta Clark, Safeguarding Federalism by Saving Health Reform: Implications of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev 541, 571 (2013) (describing federalism
conflicts in healthcare law and the Affordable Care Act); Elizabeth W. Lenoard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 781, (2012) (discussing the strategies
some states have taken to combat implementation of the Affordable Care Act, including drafting state legislation).
173
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untethered to independently enumerated federal power.180 In others, federal priorities routinely trump
local concerns, as demonstrated by federal finance law under the Commerce Clause,181 and a spate of
Supreme Court cases aggressively preempting state health and safety laws under competing federal
regulations.182
Yet environmental law represents a substantial realm of overlap where the scales of state and
federal influence go back and forth. Sometimes federal environmental law trumps all competing
considerations, perhaps demonstrated by the force with which the Endangered Species Act is usually
enforced against state actors as strictly as it is everyone else.183 Often, environmental law resolves
conflicts among independently operating state and federal regulators by allowing state judgment to trump
federal judgment when state law is more protective, but federal judgment to trump state judgment when
state law is less protective.184 This “floor preemption” regime, adopted by most federal environmental
laws, creates a federal “floor” of environmental protection that states may exceed but not undermine.185
In other legal regimes, states hold a privileged position in environmental decision-making that
goes beyond mere cooperation, and despite available federal supremacy. From the perspective of
environmental federalism, these are among the most interesting. For example, as Bill Andreen notes in
Chapter 2, states play an important role in allocating water from interstate rivers,186 notwithstanding clear
Supreme Court precedent affirming federal supremacy in the allocation of interstate water187 and
requiring congressional approval for state compacts that empower state decision-making at the expense of
federal prerogative.188 In 2005, eight states negotiated the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Compact to prevent the diversion of Great Lakes waters out of the watershed.189 Congress approved the
agreement, as it has for many similar state-led water compacts, even though it weakens federal
180

See Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 COLORADO L. REV. 1003
(2014) (discussing the difficulties of Medicaid regulation because health law is beyond Congress’s enumerated
powers, reachable in federal law only through the spending power).
181
See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 221 (2000)
(discussing federal banking and finance law). See also See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 284-85
(discussing jurisdictional overlap despite federal supremacy in the field of financial services regulation).
182
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 530, 550–51 (2001) (holding that state tobacco
advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 863-64 (2000) (holding that a common law defective design claim for failure to
equip an automobile with a driver-side airbag was preempted by a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard); but see
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-98 (2009) (declining to overrule Geier but creating confusing precedent
going forward by upholding a common law failure-to-warn claim based on a dangerous method of injecting a
pharmaceutical that had satisfied FDA labeling regulations). See also BUZBEE, supra note 160 (engaging the
preemption issue from multiple angles); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 225-37 (discussing conflicts between the
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence and the principles of federalism).
183
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§1531-1544, § 1538 (2012)).
184
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (comparing floor-preemption and ceiling-preemption alternatives).
185
Id.
186
DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 10 (2009).
187
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54, 959-60 (1982).
188
TARLOCK, supra note 186, at § 10-24 (2009).
189
Id. at § 10-32 (2009).
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prerogative in limiting the federal government’s ability to move water from the Great Lakes basin to the
high plains or arid west.190 In interpreting terms of the Yellowstone River Compact that require consent
by Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming for any water diversions outside the water basin,191 the Ninth
Circuit has held that congressional consent immunizes water compacts that encroach on the federal
commerce power this way.192 In allowing these compacts, federal courts and legislators have ceded
federal supremacy to the states on the theory that state and local actors possess superior regulatory
capacity for administering this scarce natural resource.
As Ann Carlson describes in Chapter 10, states hold a similarly privileged position in managing
coastal resources under the Coastal Zone Management Act, which enables states to veto federal
permitting decisions that conflict with state priorities in an approved Coastal Zone Management Plan.193
Under a limited waiver of federal supremacy known as the “consistency provision,” federal actors must
seek state permission for any actions that could impact coastal resources protected under a state’s coastal
management plan, a regulatory program previously negotiated between state and federal actors.194 States
may review not only those activities conducted by or on behalf of a federal agency, but also activities that
require a federal license or permit, including activities conducted pursuant to an Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act exploration plan, and any federally-funded activities that may impact the coastal zone.195 The
Act also provides a mechanism for resolving potential conflicts between state and federal priorities,
fostering early consultation and negotiated coordination.196
Indeed, as I have described in previous work, the Consistency Provision represents the final stage
in the Act’s larger project of intergovernmentally negotiated coastal management policy.197 Congress
initiates the first stage of bargaining under its spending power, offering financial and technical assistance
for voluntary state participation. In the second stage of bargaining, state and federal agencies haggle over
the terms of a state’s proposed coastal management plan, negotiating the provisions that each side most
prefers to see in the final plan. Federal leverage climaxes here, because the federal agency maintains final
approval authority and holds the ultimate carrot of federal funding. However, federal leverage is
tempered by the fact that only the state possesses the local land use planning authority and governance
capacity needed to implement effective management. In the final stage, the consistency principle shifts
the negotiating leverage further toward the states. Once the federal government approves the state plan, it

190

Id. at § 10-32 (2009).
YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT COMM’N, http://yrcc.usgs.gov/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
192
Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F. 2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1985).
193
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2012)).
194
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c); NOAA, Basic Statutory Tenets of Federal consistency, 71 Fed. Reg. 789-90.
195
Id. States may disapprove activities that “affect any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone”
unless they are “consistent to the maximum extent practicable” with accepted state management programs. 16
U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A). A federal agency may override objection only if it demonstrates that its activity is
consistent with the approved plan to the maximum extent practicable. CZMA §307(c)(1)-(2).
196
CZMA section 307 (16 U.S.C. §1456(h)(2)). See also Florida Department of Environmental Protection,
Coastal Zone Management Act, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/oip/czma.htm.
197
For more detail on intergovernmental power-sharing and negotiation under the Coastal Zone Management
Act and other areas of law, see Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, supra note 14, at
Part 3.1; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30, at 59-62; RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 302-05.
191
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effectively agrees itself to be bound by the state plan going forward, ensuring that all federal activities
directly or indirectly affecting the coastal zone will be consistent with the approved state plan.
These various platforms for state-federal negotiation set the stage for ongoing state-federal
dialogue, exchange, and innovation in regulatory decision-making, openly defying the assumptions of
zero-sum federalism. The three stages of bargaining “effectively engage state and federal actors in an
ongoing, ad infinitum dialogue about coastal management, informed by both local and national insight in
exactly the way that federalism intends:”198
The CZMA enables broadly negotiated local initiative within a framework of federal law that
ensures fidelity to both local and national concerns. It provides a useful model for
interjurisdictional governance matching broad national goals with policies best implemented at the
local level, especially where local land use authority or “place” is a necessarily salient feature of
the regulatory problem.199

Hydroelectric licensing decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission similarly include
negotiations between state and federal actors over permission to violate the otherwise applicable federal
navigational servitude,200 because the Clean Water Act’s Section 401 certification process gives states a
regulatory hook over an otherwise federal process.201 These programs of environmental federalism
represent unusual cases in which the states can hold legally trumping authority, creating rare instances in
which the federal government must negotiate for state approval when regulatory policies diverge.
(3) Classical Cooperative Federalism. As the previous sections have shown, the challenges of
jurisdictional overlap can alternatively inspire jurisdictional separation and less structured, simultaneous
regulation. However, most environmental governance falls between the extremes of strict separation and
unstructured overlap. Instead, it generally leans toward state-federal regulatory collaboration, often
through programs of cooperative federalism in which the roles of state and federal actors are formally
prescribed as asymmetrical complements.
Evolving climate and energy governance offers great opportunity to craft new models of dynamic
intergovernmental regulation, but even the most established environmental laws—including the Clean
Air202 and Water Acts,203 the Safe Drinking Water Act,204 the Resource Conservation and Recovery
198

Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, supra note 14, at Part 3.1.
Id.
200
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954) (describing how the
Commerce Clause creates a dominant servitude to regulate navigation).
201
33 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006); see also GEORGE COGGINS & ROBERT GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 37:41 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that the state certification process “represents the states’ best opportunity to
significantly affect the licensing process for hydroelectric facilities on waters within federal jurisdictions”). The
major federal licenses and permits subject to Section 401 are (1) FERC hydropower licenses, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e)
(2006) (authorizing FERC to license hydroelectric facilities); (2) Rivers and Harbors Act Section 9 and 10 permits,
33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (2006) (regulating construction in navigable waters); and (3) CWA Sections 402 and 404
permits in the few states that have not assumed NPDES permitting authority, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (outlining the
“National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System” permitting regime); see also Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped
Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 219–20 (1996).
202
Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2011).
199
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Act,205 the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,206 the Superfund Act,207 the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,208 and even the Endangered Species Act209—all
incorporate programs of cooperative federalism in which state and federal actors simultaneously operate
within a single regulatory organism.210 Rather than merely colliding over separate efforts that
occasionally overlap, these traditional programs of cooperative federalism all purposely engage state and
federal actors in an ongoing series of consultation, negotiation, and compromise.211 The following section
explores in more detail how the more traditional models of environmental federalism allocate state and
federal authority in realms of jurisdictional overlap.
B. The Tools of Cooperative Environmental Federalism. Interjurisdictional environmental
problems cannot be managed exclusively at the local or national level, because they require governance
capacity from the full spectrum of governance scale.212 For that reason, cooperative environmental
federalism models strive to partner the needed elements that tend to be superior at the federal level with
elements that are usually superior at the state and local level, ideally through processes that empower each
level to perform to their strengths.
Federally superior governance capacity often includes, inter alia: scientific, technical, and
financial resources; the legal authority to enforce nationally uniform standards; the ability to appropriately
scale regulation for large-scale public commons; and the ability to police spillover effects from one
autonomously acting state to another. Elements of governance capacity that tend to be superior at the
state and local level often include: detailed expertise about local environmental, geographic, economic,
demographic, political, and cultural factors that bear on the needs and workability of regulatory proposals;
locally situated enforcement personnel; the legal authority to regulate local land use and engage in
comprehensive land use planning; and other police power-based legal authority to regulate beyond the
more limited set of federally enumerated powers. (Of course, these generalizations bear exceptions.)
203

Clean Water Act, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2011).
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. (1996)
205
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, codified as part of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (2006).
206
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977), codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (2006).
207
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, codified as amended throughout 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2011).
208
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986), 42
U.S.C. § 11001 et seq. (2011).
209
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973), codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531
et seq. (2012).
210
See Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180 (separately describing each of these
programs of environmental cooperative federalism with special attention to their spending power-related elements).
211
My own research focuses heavily on the phenomenon of how much federalism-sensitive governance is, in
fact, the product of intergovernmental bargaining. Negotiated federalism includes examples of conventional
political haggling, formalized methods of collaborative policymaking, and even more remote signaling processes by
which state and federal actors share responsibility for public decision making over time. Id. First explored in
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30, the negotiation of federalism-sensitive governance became a core insight of
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 10.
212
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 145-80.
204
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Governance that skillfully partners complementary capacity across levels enhances the regulatory voice of
each, harnessing synergy in a way that belies the old zero-sum federalism game.
Intergovernmental partnerships may involve direct state-federal coordination, but they are often
mediated by statutory structures that asymmetrically allocate decision-making authority within programs
of coordinated capacity, federally-supported state implementation, conditional preemption, and shared
and general permitting programs. Each of these methods strives to maximize local and national authority
where each can best contribute, and many have been pioneered by environmental law.
(1) Coordinated Capacity. Environmental federalism programs that coordinate capacity partner
the distinct regulatory skillsets of state and federal actors relatively straightforwardly. For example, the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, codified as a later addition to the larger
Superfund statute, engages state and local experts in coordinated planning for chemical and other
emergencies.213 It harnesses local capacity by requiring each state to establish an Emergency Response
Commission drawing on technical expertise from all relevant state agencies.214 It partners local expertise
with federal capacity by authorizing the U.S. EPA to require compliance by all relevant facilities with the
emergency planning provisions created by each state’s commission.215 This structure drew praise as an
early cooperative federalism model, enhancing interjurisdictional synergy by trading a fully federalized
response for one enabling more expert state implementation.216 However, it was also criticized for not
allowing states to opt out of participation in favor of direct federal regulation.217
(2) Federally Supported State Implementation. More often, however, environmental federalism
partnerships are crafted around complex regulatory regimes that offer states greater regulatory choices.
One model that is common in environmental law and elsewhere is the model of federally-supported state
implementation, in which the federal government offers state governments financial and technical
resources to help implement federal goals. Relying on Congress’s power under the Spending Clause,218
the federal government offers grants to states in exchange for their participation and to facilitate state
accomplishment of related regulatory goals.219 In this way, the federal government negotiates for state
participation in spending power-based partnerships, with federal support for state implementation. (And
213

42 U.S.C. § 11001-11050 (2011).
See id. §§ 11001(a), 11045; see also http://www.epa.gov/region4/air/epcra/sercs.htm (listing commissioners).
For an example of the wide range of state capacity included in a state commission, see the membership of North
Carolina’s State Emergency Response Commission. North Carolina Department of Public Safety, Commission
Members, https://www.nccrimecontrol.org/Index2.cfm?a=000003,000010,000064,000393 (last visited Sep. 23,
2014) (listing participants from state agencies addressing law enforcement, transportation, medical services,
environment, agriculture, fire, and others).
215
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(a), 11045 (2011).
216
See Hubert H. Humphrey III, LeRoy C. Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in Environmental
Enforcement: A Proposal for a More Effective and More Efficient Relationship, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 7, 27
(1990) (noting that EPCRA “for the first time gave states extensive direct authority to enforce a federal
environmental law in federal court”).
217
See Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA’s Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549, 550 (1994) (arguing that
EPCRA “[e]schew[s] traditional incentives for eliciting state regulation,” instead “issu[ing] a flat command”).
218
U.S. CONST. art I, sec. 8
219
See, e.g., Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180, at 1009-1017 (discussing
spending power bargaining and its legal history).
214
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while the Supreme Court recently constrained spending power bargaining that would tie very large federal
grants to indirectly related conditions,220 few if any environmental programs are likely to be impacted.221)
Spending power partnerships are attractive to states because they come with fiscal incentives and
because they enable states the choice of participation, enhancing the potential for synergy with respect for
local autonomy. In some cases, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act, a state maintains total
discretion over whether the regulatory program will exist within its boundaries, because the law provides
for no federal intervention if the state declines the deal.222 Spending power partnerships are attractive to
the federal government because they enable Congress to negotiate with states for policymaking influence
in regulatory realms that lie beyond its more directly enumerated powers223—and is thus an important
device in federal education,224 social services,225 and health care law.226 By contrast, however,
environmental law is usually grounded in such federally enumerated powers as the Commerce Clause,227
the Property Clause,228 and occasionally other grants of federal authority, such as the Treaty Clause.229 In
programs of cooperative environmental federalism, spending power partnerships are mostly used to invite
state participation in regulatory efforts that the federal government could theoretically administer
exclusively, but which will be far more effective when incorporating the local expertise and enforcement
capacity of state and local partners.
For example, in the larger Superfund program—the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act—Congress incentivized state participation in the management of toxic
waste through a series of spending power partnerships.230 As Klass and Fazio describe in Chapter 3, the
Act imposes liability for involvement with hazardous substances that endanger human health or the
environment, and it is mostly federally administered. However, the statute authorizes discretionary grants
to encourage state participation and leadership in cleanup efforts,231 and it makes states and tribes eligible
220

National Federation of Independent Businesses vs. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See generally Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180 (evaluating all
environmental spending power programs under the new precedent and concluding that all of them, even potentially
vulnerable Clean Air Act highway fund sanctions, should survive scrutiny).
222
See RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 303.
223
See Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180, at 1011-1013 (explaining spending
power bargaining), 1027-28 (listing spending power partnerships in various areas of law), 1033-34 (discussing the
limited constitutional footing of certain spending power partnerships beyond the federal spending power).
224
See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§§ 6301–7941 (reauthorizing the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 6301).
225
See, e.g., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§§ 601–79, 603 (authorizing federal grants to
states to offer assistance to qualifying poor families).
226
See, e.g., Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, §1396a (authorizing state-federal partnerships in the administration of
health insurance).
227
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec.8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress to regulate the channels, persons, and things of
interstate commerce, as well as activities having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce).
228
U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec.3, cl. 2 (conferring federal authority over all federal lands and other resources that
constitute the property of the United States).
229
U.S. CONST. art. II, sec.2, . 2 (together with the Supremacy Clause, art. VI, cl. 2, conferring federal authority
to make and enforce international treaties with environmental implications).
230
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended throughout 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2011).
231
See id. § 9604.
221
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for Brownfield Grants to lead management efforts at less-contaminated sites.232 The Endangered Species
Act is also primarily administered by federal actors, but it also invites collaborative state enforcement
through several small federal grant programs.233 As Kalyani Robbins explains in Chapter 5, the Act
provides various protections for threatened and endangered species of animals and plants through federal
consultation and enforcement,234 but the statute also authorizes small-scale spending-power partnerships
capitalizing on local capacity through the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, Habitat
Conservation Planning Assistance Grants, and Habitat Conservation Plan Land Acquisition grants.235
(3) Conditional Preemption. Still, the classic model of cooperative environmental federalism that
has been pioneered, if not invented in environmental law is the model of conditional preemption, by
which the federal government sets goals or standards that may be implemented by the states.236 In this
model, the states are invited to participate in accomplishing the overall regulatory goal by tailoring the
implementation of federal standards in a way that best suits local political, geographic, economic, and
demographic circumstances. However, if the states decline to participate, the federal government will
regulate in-state activity directly, preempting any conflicting state law. These programs safeguard a
centralized response while opening possibilities for local autonomy and interjurisdictional synergy. Of
note, many environmental laws deploy federally-supported state implementation and conditional
preemption simultaneously.
For example, under the Clean Water Act, state and federal actors share supervision of the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, which prohibits the discharge of federally designated
pollutants into protected water bodies without a permit.237 The law is designed around a program of
conditional preemption that allows EPA to act as the permitting authority or to delegate authority to
willing states.238 However, nearly all states have chosen to administer their own permitting programs, in
order to maximize regulatory autonomy in managing in-state water resources and economic
development.239 The Clean Water Act also uses the federal spending power to support state
implementation directly, authorizing various federal grants to states to improve water quality,240 including
232

Id. §§ 9604(k) (discussing brownfields revitalization funding), 9628(a)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that States and
tribes may use grants to capitalize a revolving loan fund for brownfield remediation). Section 128(a) was added to
CERCLA in 2002 by the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act. Pub. L. No. 107-118,
§ 128(a), 115 Stat. 2356, 2376–2377 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2011)).
233
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973), codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311543 (2012).
234
Id.
235
Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 16, 2014),
.http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/grants/S6_grants.html.
236
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 87 (2009) (discussing conditional preemption);
see generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth
Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 289 (1984).
237
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1387, 1342(b) (2012).
238
Id. at § 1342(a). See also Andree, Chapter X.
239
E.g., N.M. ENV’T DEP’T, NPDES STATE PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION BRIEFING PAPER (2004), available at
http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/swqb/PSRS/NPDES-DelegationBriefingPaper_June-04.pdf (discussing the benefits
of self-administration).
240
The CWA includes fourteen categorical grant programs to states, including those to provide water pollution
control program support, public water system supervision, underground water source protection, beach monitoring,
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those made under the State Revolving Fund (SRF).241 The Safe Drinking Water Act further authorizes
federal standards implemented by state and local agencies,242 coupled with the Drinking Water State
Revolving Loan Fund that helps public water agencies finance the infrastructure projects needed to
comply with federal drinking water regulations.243
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which regulates the environmental, social, and
economic harms of surface mining,244 uses a similar combination of conditional preemption and federally
supported state implementation. The law enables states to implement their own regulatory programs or
opt for direct federal regulation,245 and it authorizes federal grants to assist states in developing their own
permitting programs.246 This Act takes the possibilities for state initiative one step further, authorizing
cooperative agreements by which states may act as the primary regulators of coal mining operations on
federal lands within the state.247 Under these agreements, federal supremacy and federal sovereignty over
nationally owned lands are exchanged for the efficiencies of scale and regulatory continuity offered by
unified state management. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,248 which regulates hazardous
substances through lifecycle oversight, similarly enables states to choose whether to submit to federal
regulation or implement the program within state boundaries.249
The Clean Air Act also merges a version of conditional preemption with spending power
bargaining, though—perhaps uniquely among environmental law—as less of a carrot and more of a
stick.250 The Act anticipates that EPA will set ambient air quality standards and that states will design and
administer State Implementation Plans for attaining these standards.251 States that fail or decline to do so
will eventually be regulated directly by EPA under a Federal Implementation Plan, a variation on the
252
conditional preemption model discussed above.
In the meanwhile, however, noncompliant states may

and nonpoint source pollution control. EPA, NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM GUIDANCE FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 49-50
(April 2010), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100E5WU.pdf.
241
33 U.S.C. § 1381 (2006).
242
Safe Drinking Water Act §1443, 42 U.S.C. § 300f.
243
Pub. L. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f-j (1996)).
244
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (2006)).
245
See id. §§ 1253, 1254 (describing the state and federal programs for regulating surface coal mining and
reclamation operations).
246
Id. § 1295; OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION & ENFORCEMENT, Regulatory Programs Overview, in
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (2010), available at http://www.osmre.gov/lrg/fam/5-100.pdf; Basics of SMCRA
Title IV, W. PA. COAL. FOR ABANDONED MINE RECLAMATION (May, 2007), available at
.http://www.wpcamr.org/projects/smcra_reauth/TitleIV%20Basics.pdf.
247
30 U.S.C. § 1273. (2006).
248
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as part of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2006)).
249
EPA, Authorizing States to Implement RCRA, in RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL 2011, at III-133, III-134
(2011), available at www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/pubs/orientat/rom311.pdf (“As of August 2008, all states, with
the exception of Alaska and Iowa, are authorized to implement the RCRA hazardous waste program.”).
250
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2012).
251
Id. at § 7509(b)(1) (mandating state implementation plans).
252
If a state declines to create a State Implementation Plan (SIP), or if the EPA concludes that a submitted SIP
fails to meet statutory criteria, the EPA is required to create a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for that state within
two years. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(c)(1).
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be threatened with the loss of federal highway funds offered under a separate spending partnership with
the federal Department of Transportation.253 The threatened loss of federal funds for noncompliance sets
the Clean Air Act apart from other environmental laws, most of which use federal funds as an enticement
for action rather than as a sanction for inaction.254 Nevertheless, the conditional preemption elements of
the partnership limit the impact of the highway fund sanctions, because when EPA assumes regulatory
responsibility within a noncompliant state, the threat of highway fund sanctions are lifted.255
As Glicksman & Wentz explain in Chapter 1, the design of the Clean Air Act reflects its
architects’ intentions that the federal government remains the senior partner in this state-federal
partnership, reserving dominant centralized authority to resolve the collective action elements of the
interstate air pollution problem. After all, this is a problem that results not only from polluting activities
solidly rooted in place but also to countless mobile pollution sources (both domestically and
internationally) that are less meaningfully related to local expertise and land use authority.256
Nevertheless, the Clean Air Act remains an intergovernmental partnership that enables states to more
efficiently manage the benefits and burdens of regulation on in-state communities and economies than a
fully preemptive model--explaining why nearly all states have chosen to assume responsibility for State
Implementation Plans rather than submit to a Federal Implementation Plan.257
(4) Shared and General Permitting Programs. The Clean Air Act especially showcases the
asymmetry of state and federal roles within environmental federalism, but most state-federal partnerships
follow a similar model, in which federal judgment usually trumps on regulatory goals and standards,
while local judgment usually gets federal deference on matters of design and implementation that account
for diverse local circumstances. In fact, environmental law has pioneered different ways of formalizing
this asymmetrical allocation of state and federal authority through its different approaches to shared and
general permitting programs.

253

Clean Air Act §179 requires that federal highway funds be withheld from a state that has failed to prepare an
adequate SIP or failed to implement requirements under an approved plan when that state includes “non-attainment
areas,” or areas that have not achieved the federally established National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401–7671q, 7509(b)(1) (2012). The EPA has considerable discretion about how and when to apply sanctions
(and indeed, has only done so on one occasion), but the Act mandates withholding of certain federal highway funds
if noncompliance extends beyond 18–24 months. 42 U.S.C.A. §7509(a). For a fuller discussion of the mechanics of
the Clean Air Act highway fund sanctions, see Ryan, supra note 180180, at 1049-59.
254
See Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180, at 1034-49.
255
Section 179 itself is ambiguous on this point, but EPA has formalized this interpretation in the implementing
regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 93.120 (2013), to which a reviewing court must defer, . See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). For a discussion of how this regulatory design likely immunizes the Clean Air Act highway fund
sanctions against challenge under new spending power limits set forth in National Federation of Independent
Businesses vs. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), see Ryan, supra note 180, at 1034-49.
256
For this reason, federal authority can intrude on state discretion even within state implementation plans,
through federal regulations of tailpipe emissions and new source review and performance standards associated with
large stationary sources. 42. U.S.C. § 7411 (2012).
257
See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Status of SIP Requirements for Designated Areas (Last
updated Sep. 21, 2014) http://www.epa.gov/oar/urbanair/sipstatus/reports/map_s.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2014)
(providing details on all individual state SIPs)..
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The conditional preemption model of shared permitting responsibility emerged in various formats
over the 1970s in the Clean Air and Water Acts, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and also in the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), which enables states to assume permitting responsibility over safe working conditions or opt for
direct federal regulation.258 Interestingly, however, while nearly all states elect to assume permitting
responsibility in the environmental context, fewer than half the states have opted to participate as coregulators under OSHA.259 While it is impossible to know the reason for this with confidence, it may
suggest that environmental law sits at the equipoise of state and federal regulatory interests in a way that
more conventional commercial regulation does not. If a state believes that federal decision-makers will
be just as capable at regulating worker safety, then allowing the feds to absorb the political and financial
costs of regulation is a rational choice. The fact that states usually make the opposite call in
environmental contexts—choosing the burdens of regulating over the risk that federal regulators will
cause damage—affirms that environmental governance includes factors that are intensely more local in
valence, including regulation of land use.
Nevertheless, the environmental model is being viewed with increasing interest in other realms of
cooperative federalism, for example, health law. After the Supreme Court invalidated portions of the
Affordable Care Act for exceeding the federal spending power,260 the architects of national health policy
are taking great interest in the Clean Air Act’s model of partnering mandatory state implementation plans
with a federal fallback option.261 Especially where federal authority is grounded primarily by the
Spending Clause,262 the conditional preemption model is likely to become a fixture in state-federal
partnerships far beyond environmental law.263
Yet another regulatory device pioneered by environmental law for coordinating state and federal
authority in realms of jurisdictional overlap is the use of general permitting programs. The general permit
is a tool of regulatory governance that maximizes discretion and minimizes the regulatory burden for
applicants, allowing permit applicants to obtain permission to engage in regulatory activity by following a
general set of instructions that provide guidance about acceptable and unacceptable activity.264 For
258

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78. (2012).
See Occupational Safety and Health Administration, All About OSHA,
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/3302-06N-2006-English.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2014).
260
National Federation of Independent Business vs. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012).
261
See Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180, at 1061 (noting that “one scholar
intimate with the development of the ACA suggests that if the drafters could do it again, they would likely have
structured some sort of federal fallback provision [like the Clean Air Act’s] into the Medicaid expansion”). See also
Sara Rosenbaum & Patricia Gabow, Open Exchanges to the Poor in States that Opt Out of Medicaid, ROLL CALL
(July 26, 2013),
.http://www.rollcall.com/news/open_exchanges_to_the_poor_in_states_that_opt_out_of_medicaid_commentary226677-1.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2014).
262
U.S. CONST. art I, sec. 8.
263
See Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law, supra note 180, at 1061. While spending power
partnerships face new scrutiny after the Affordable Care Act case, very few will involve federal grants large enough
to trigger scrutiny under the doctrine, especially those that are also grounded in independent sources of
constitutional authority. See Ryan, supra note 180, at 1027-30.
264
See, e.g., Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Role of Permits in the Regulatory State, REGBLOG, July 1, 2014,
http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/01-biber-ruhl-permits-in-the-regulatory-state.html. See also Eric Biber & J.B.
259
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example, the Army Corps of Engineers uses a general permit to govern the filling of wetlands protected
by Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, allowing countless public and private actors nationwide to obtain
permission to fill wetlands with minimal regulatory oversight according to a specified set of federal
guidance, with state input.265 Section 404 also allows states to assume responsibility for general
permitting programs within their boundaries, combining the devices of general permitting and conditional
preemption.266
More interestingly, though, general permitting can also be used to asymmetrically allocate state
and federal authority within particularly federalism-sensitive governance, especially when state actors
must seek federal approval for their own regulated activity or for state regulation of private activity that is
also subject to federal regulation. For example, Section 404 also enables states themselves to seek
coverage under a State Program General Permit to discharge dredged and fill material to wetlands.267
Like other methods of allocating asymmetrical authority within environmental federalism programs, the
general permit allows federal actors to establish the boundaries of permissible activity while enabling
state and local actors to move creatively but responsibly within those parameters (at least in comparison
to more intensive preemptive regulation).
When used in these federalism-sensitive contexts, general permits balance central authority with
local autonomy by enabling state actors to satisfy broadly-framed federal standards by whatever means
they choose. Ideally, the general permit alternative encourages synergy and innovation while
streamlining the regulatory process. For example, the Clean Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater rule
administers municipal stormwater discharges under a general permit that enables localities to develop
their own unique programs for meeting overarching federal goals.268 The regulation of stormwater
pollution sits “vexingly at the crossroad between land uses regulated locally and water pollution regulated
federally,”269 because most regulated stormwater discharges are by municipal storm drains.270 Through a
Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64
DUKE L. J. (forthcoming, 2014).
265
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Section 404 Permitting (2013) available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/ (last visited Sep. 23, 2014) (explaining the Section 404
general permit program); US Army Corps of Engineers, ORM Permit Decisions, available at
http://geo.usace.army.mil/egis/f?p=340:1:0 (last visited Sep. 23, 2014) (providing direction on how to apply for a §
404 general permit. See also Biber and Ruhl, supra note 264 (discussing the § 404 general permit option).
266
United States Environmental Protection Agency, State, Tribal, Local, and Regional Roles in Wetlands
Protection (2012), http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/fact21.cfm (last visited Sep. 23, 2014). EPA notes
that states and tribes may also strengthen their roles in wetlands protection by: “undertaking comprehensive State
Wetland Conservation Plans…; developing wetland water quality standards; applying the Clean Water Act Section
401 Water Quality Certification program more specifically to wetlands; incorporating wetlands protection into other
State and Tribal water programs;” and comprehensive resource planning, including the protection of specified river
corridors and watersheds. Id.
267
Id. (noting that states “may strengthen their roles in wetlands protection by… obtaining State Program
General Permits from the Corps for discharges of dredged and fill material in wetlands”).
268
33 U.S.C. §1342(p)(4) (2000) (authorizing the “Phase I” and “Phase II” Stormwater Rules); EPA, Permits for
Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4s), (July 14, 2014),
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/stormwater/Municipal-Separate-Storm-Sewer-System-MS4-Main-Page.cfm;
See also RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10 at 153-56, 300-01.
269
RYAN, TUG OF WAR, supra note 10, at 300-01; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30, at 55-56.
270
See Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 840–41 (9th Cir. 2003).
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decade of intense negotiated rulemaking, federal, state, municipal, environmental, and industrial
stakeholders designed a general permitting program to empower local discretion as much as possible
while still accomplishing federal Clean Water Act goals.271 The resulting rule allows municipal
dischargers to be covered under the general permit by tailoring local management plans to best address
local circumstances while meeting five basic federal criteria.272 Such general permitting programs mirror
the classical environmental federalism balance of state and federal power, in which federal judgment
prevails on matters of standards and state judgment prevails on matters of design.
General permitting represents another important tool of regulation that is not widely understood
beyond the realm of environmental law. In fact, the legal community’s failure to grasp the significance of
general permits in environmental law may have led the Supreme Court astray in another environmental
decision with important federalism implications,273 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, limiting EPA’s
ability to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gases.274 The Court upheld Clean Air Act regulation
of stationary greenhouse gas sources if they also emit other regulated pollutants, but not stationary
sources that only emit greenhouse gases.275 The majority concluded that allowing greenhouse gas
emissions to be regulated independently would produce “calamitous consequences,” because
“extravagant” federal authority and resources would be required to administer so many sources.276
But as Professors Eric Biber and J.B. Ruhl have argued, general permitting represents an
“alternative between complete exclusion of a range of activities from regulation and burdensome,
complex permitting structures,” alleviating the Court’s seemingly unresolvable concerns about expansive
federal reach.277 Indeed, these scholars predict that general permitting structures will prove critical in the
future regulation of climate change precisely because they enable streamlined regulation “of widespread
and common activities in ways that are politically, legally, and administratively feasible.”278 Emerging

271

Id. at 864. The Phase II Final Rule was published in the Federal Register on December 8, 1999. See
Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg.
68722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124).
272
See Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d at 847–48. Specifically, dischargers may develop any program that: (1)
educates the public about stormwater hygiene, (2) incorporates public participation, (3) prevents illicit discharges,
(4) controls construction debris, and (5) manages pollutant runoff from municipal operations. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)
(2010).
273
Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, General Permits and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, REGBLOG, (July 23,
2014),, http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/23-biber-ruhl-general-permits-and-the-regulation-of-greenhousegases.html.
274
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (upholding portions of the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration
Program and Title V permitting program that regulated greenhouse gases from stationary sources under regulation
for other pollutants, but invalidating them as applied to stationary sources only subject to regulation for greenhouse
gases).
275
Id. at 2449.
276
Id. at 2442-44.
277
Biber & Ruhl, supra note 273 (arguing that “the Court dismissed general permits out of hand as a way of
addressing the challenges that greenhouse gases present to the Clean Air Act when, in fact, general permits have
already been widely adopted by states and the EPA as a tool to manage permitting problems under both the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act. General permits are not novel, untested tools, as Scalia’s footnote seems to imply.
They are workhorses of the regulatory state”).
278
Id.

40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532687

Erin Ryan

Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within

8/20/2014

climate federalism partnerships should take note of the potential of these tools for effective multiscalar
governance.
V. Conclusion: Who Should Decide?
Wrestling with the incendiary tensions at the intersection of local land use and spillover harm,
environmental federalism has helpfully exposed the fault lines underlying our federal system to analysis.
Some of the structural tools that environmental law has developed for managing these tensions may be
instructive for health reform, education law, marijuana policy, and other areas of law contending with
similar federalism controversies. To be sure, not every aspect of federalism can be generalized from the
environmental experience, and environmental law has yet to perfect its task. Nevertheless, the challenges
of environmental governance provide critical insight into the core conflicts of federalism-sensitive
governance more broadly, and the successes of environmental governance indicate the potential for
exporting effective regulatory strategies. This conclusion suggests a few potential lessons from the
environmental experience for related areas of law.
Environmental governance has experimented with different means of allocating regulatory
authority across multiscalar lines, often asymmetrically. Different statutory programs engage multiple
regulatory stakeholders while allocating roles according to the distinctive strengths of local and national
capacity. The conventional tools of cooperative environmental federalism—including coordinated
capacity, federally-supported state implementation, conditional preemption, and shared and general
permit programs—may prove useful in other realms of jurisdictional overlap, especially where the need
for a centralized response is matched by strong local capacity rooted in core expressions of the states’
police power. Education law, social services delivery, and public health laws may be good candidates, as
might national security partnerships, criminal law enforcement, and even financial services regulation.
For example, the Affordable Care Act might have fared better on judicial review had the
Medicaid Expansion been coupled with a federal fallback provision, borrowing from the environmental
federalism model of conditional preemption.279 Perhaps the skilled use of a general permitting
partnership could help harmonize state and federal regulation of the complex financial services
industry,280 as Bieber and Ruhl argue it could for the complex project of greenhouse gas regulation, by
streamlining points of contact around clear and critical standards. Programs of coordinated capacity and
federally supported state implementation already exist in other areas of law, but the results in
environmental law and elsewhere clearly show that programs enabling two-way exchange are more
successful than federal efforts at unidirectional policymaking.281 Famous failures in cooperative
federalism, such as the No Child Left Behind Act or the REAL ID Act,282 could learn from the channels
of exchange cultivated in the most successful examples of environmental law, such as the Coastal Zone
Management and Clean Water Acts.
279

See supra text accompanying notes 260-261.
Cf. Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 30, at 30-31.
281
Compare id. at 62-63 (discussing state-based innovations under the Social Security Act) with id. at 88-90
(discussing state resistance to the No Child Left Behind Act).
282
See id. at 88-90 (No Child Left Behind), 56-58 (REAL ID).
280

41

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532687

Erin Ryan

Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within

8/20/2014

Indeed, environmental scholars—especially among the emerging dynamic federalism literature—
are increasingly emphasizing the values of overlap, fluidity, exchange, and negotiation among separately
regulating local, state, and federal actors. Innovations in federalism theory, such as the Balanced
Federalism model in Part II, should help the architects of governance further tailor the tools of
conventional cooperative federalism in service of federalism’s underlying values.283 Architects could
capitalize on the existing asymmetrical allocation of authority to more effectively engage insight and
capacity at the local level, and to more strategically allocate roles among executive, legislative, and
judicial decision-makers where each is most able. For example, a Balanced Federalism evaluation of
New York’s challenge to the Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Act284 might have led the
Supreme Court to defer to a federal legislative plan forged by nearly universal consent among state
executives (one negotiated behind the veil of regulatory ignorance, before more parochial interests took
hold), heading off the current crisis of regulatory abdication.285
Relatedly, federalism theory should push regulators to recognize that many of the difficult
dynamics of jurisdictional overlap that are formally recognized within state-federal relations are equally
meaningful in municipal-state relations. While the U.S. Constitution falsely presumes that municipal
interests are synonymous with that of their state, federalism controversies over fracking and other energy
harvesting especially reveals intrastate conflicts. Local-state conflicts may be cognizable under state
constitutions, which occasionally empower local prerogative over other state interests.286 At any rate,
these conflicts should be duly considered in the elaboration of good federalism-sensitive governance.
One important lesson of environmental governance is that there is no one size to fit all regulatory
needs, and different federalism values may take priority under different circumstances. For example, the
CZMA, a federal statutory framework that enables multiple iterations of open bargaining between state
executive actors toward the creation of corresponding state legislation, provides a good example of how
to integrate state/federal and legislative/executive capacity where place-based local diversity is the most
critical factor.287 A very different model is taken by the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for regulating motor
vehicle emissions, which enables states to follow either the federal or California standard—limiting the
variability of regulation within the national market of automobile manufacturing while still enabling the
benefits of regulatory competition.288 This model enables effective dynamic interaction within a more
centralized regime, in which the constraints of a national market are the most critical factor.289
In general, governance architects designing new regulatory structures of cooperative federalism
must consider all of the implicated federalism values, weighing carefully whether any one takes priority
over another. While most federalism-sensitive governance should incorporate some means of multiscalar
283
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coordination, the balance may shift as needed toward a more centralized approach, such as conditional
preemption under the Clean Air Act, or a more locally empowering approach, such as the CZMA’s
reverse preemption within a program of federally supported state implementation. The more all values
are in equipoise, the more the regulatory framework should allow for adaptive management through
ongoing deliberation among regulatory stakeholders.
To that end, the preceding chapters demonstrate that ongoing environmental dilemmas require
continued innovation and ongoing adaption. Improving the coordination of local, state, and federal
capacity in realms of jurisdictional overlap remains the central challenge of environmental law. Several
earlier chapters identify statutory systems in which more federal authority may be needed to resolve
collective action problems, including Blake Hudson’s discussion of forest resources (Chapter 4), Kalyani
Robbins’ discussion of species protection (Chapter 5), and Bill Andreen’s discussion of water law
(Chapter 2). Glicksman & Wentz defend the importance of federal authority in the Clean Air Act
regulatory partnership (Chapter 1), prompted by competing claims for greater local devolution. These
authors persuasively describe environmental regulatory contexts in which the values of central authority
may outweigh countervailing values of local autonomy.
In their discussions of climate and energy law, Bill Buzbee (Chapter 7), Kirsten Engel (Chapter
8), Alice Kaswan (Chapter 9), and Hannah Wiseman (Chapter 6) tout the benefits of jurisdictional overlap
between strong local and national regulators, in the hopes that regulatory dynamism will promote wellinformed decisions, focus different regulatory capacity at different elements of the overall problem, and
overcome agency capture through regulatory backstop. Here, the values of local autonomy and central
authority each make strong claims for primacy, but the overall goals of regulatory problem-solving are
most furthered by dynamic interaction. Robert Fowler (Chapter 12), Behnke & Eppler (Chapter 13), and
Sairam Bhat (Chapter 14) describe how similar tensions are respectively navigated within the Australian,
Indian, and German federal systems.
In still other areas of environmental law, localism values may appropriately take priority.
Hirokawa & Rosenbloom argue that preserving the primacy of local land use authority is necessary to
protect ecosystems and communities (Chapter 11). Ann Carlson shows how environmental regulation of
coastal and water resources appropriately privilege local concerns over central oversight through
mechanisms of “reverse preemption” (Chapter 10). However, Klass & Fazio warn that new Supreme
Court precedent privileging state laws of repose over federal Superfund mandates can effectively “reverse
preempt” hazardous waste cleanup, in ways that compromise the overall statutory mission (Chapter 3).
With so many considerations at play, it is hard to imagine environmental law—or any federalismsensitive governance—reaching a definitive answer to the question of who should decide. Strictly
segregating state and federal efforts in interjurisdictional contexts is unlikely to work well, as
demonstrated by failed environmental governance over radioactive waste management and nonpoint
source water pollution.290 Yet leaving jurisdictional matters fully unresolved can also have serious
consequences. Doctrinal uncertainty may deter effective regulatory problem solving where it is needed if
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regulators fear becoming embroiled in legal challenges to their assertion of contested authority.291 The
sharp decline in Clean Water Act enforcement after Rapanos demonstrates this peril, leading to
worsening water quality across the country. Alternatively, doctrinal uncertainty can encourage selfserving regulatory abdication, if all levels of government cast the regulatory dilemma as someone else’s
responsibility.292 And the two are sometimes related. As noted, there has been precious little movement
in managing the problem of radioactive waste after New York eviscerated the enforcement provisions of
the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act.293
From the Balanced Federalism perspective, the lessons from these failures in environmental
federalism suggest that the allocation of federalism interpretive responsibilities should not only better
track national and local capacity, but the unique capacities the different branches of government.294
Judicial federalism constraints should be reserved for clear legal questions that courts are equipped to
answer, and political constraints should operate in contested contexts of overlap where multiscalar
interests are well represented.295 If the purpose of federalism is to ensure that governance affecting
distinctively local and national interests appropriately accounts for both, then governance that is the
product of informed, accountable, multiscalar collaborative process warrants deference because it
accomplishes that goal.296 At a minimum, courts reviewing federalism claims should carefully consider
the larger ramifications for good governance when evaluating difficult jurisdictional questions.
Heeding these lessons, well-crafted multiscalar governance belies the perverse presumption of
zero-sum federalism, which assumes that the allocation of decision-making authority among levels and
agents of government is always a zero-sum game.297 Defying the presumption that authority exercised by
one is categorically removed from others, environmental governance has experimented with different
ways of enhance authority among multiple agents simultaneously, through structured programs of
consultation and exchange. This empirical assault on the mythos of zero-sum federalism warrants
emphasis, drawing attention to what most American federalism actually looks like in practice, and how
federalism in practice increasingly departs from the rhetoric of conventional federalism theory.298
In the end, perhaps the problem that stymies all federalism-sensitive governance is the
assumption underlying the question with which we began. “Who should decide?” presumes a simple
answer, and in contexts of profound jurisdictional overlap, there is rarely a simple answer. Environmental
federalism has shown that the best response is often to inform interjurisdictional governance with multiple
perspectives as feasibly as possible, through ongoing processes of exchange, adaptation, and negotiation
among stakeholders at all levels of jurisdictional scale. Balanced federalism suggests that similar
principles apply to the allocation of decision-making authority along the horizontal separation of powers.
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Good interjurisdictional governance engages not only the distinctive capacity at different levels of
government vertically but from the different branches of government within each level. Legislative,
executive, and judicial coordination at all levels of scale are needed to manage the difficult trade-offs that
federalism-sensitive governance always has, and always will, require of us.
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